SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE
Alina S. Ball
The social enterprise movement has ushered in a promising new wave
of companies using market-based strategies to advance social and
environmental change. The longevity and growth of social enterprises will
be determined by their ability to balance the complex and often competing
interests within these unique business entities. The established corporate
governance regime, which predominately addresses the characteristics of
public companies, does not provide adequate oversight for promoting good
corporate governance within the social enterprise sector. This Article
argues that the benefit reporting requirements in hybrid-corporation statutes
offer an innovative mechanism for encouraging and maintaining good
social enterprise governance. Using the benefit reporting requirements
within hybrid-corporation statutes as a model, this Article provides a
normative framework and establishes the implementation principles for
social enterprise governance across various legal entities. By counseling
social enterprises on how to promote participatory democracy and increase
the company’s capacity to detect and address problems, corporate lawyers
serve a critical function in developing social enterprise governance. Using
an approach guided by corporate lawyers and informed by social enterprise
practitioners would build on the traditional corporate governance paradigm
to develop narrowly tailored mechanisms that facilitate a more resilient
social enterprise sector.
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INTRODUCTION
The social enterprise1 ethos of conducting business fundamentally
alters the ways in which a company should be governed because it compels
directors and officers to make corporate decisions that account for the
divergent interests of the company’s stakeholders and to consider the
decisions’ broader impact on society.2 Social enterprises are business
ventures that intentionally affect societal good. The sustainability of earlystage social enterprises is particularly vulnerable because they rarely
operate at a high profit margin. As a result, the wrong executive decisions
are more likely to end the business because there is little operating reserve
to sustain the company’s recovery. Moreover, social enterprises must
constantly manage the conflicting interests of profit returns and social
impact,3 which is hard to do. Thus, social enterprises need good corporate
governance practices and enforcement mechanisms if the sector will
thrive.4 Corporate governance describes the system of internal controls to
regulate people, processes, and policies within an organization. Social
enterprises in the United States are subject to state and, where applicable,
federal laws regarding corporate governance. But there is an absence of
regulatory oversight to enforce good governance models within the social
enterprise sector because most social enterprises do not exceed the

1. See infra Part I.A.
2. J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2012) (discussing how
directors are instructed to implement stakeholder governance, but are given no guidance
about how accomplish that); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101 cmt. (B LAB Jan. 13,
2016),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_2016.pd
f [https://perma.cc/DX3R-7G7X] (identifying benefit corporations as “a business that
operates with a corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value and that
consciously undertakes a responsibility to maximize the benefits of its operations for all
stakeholders, not just shareholders”); BRIDGES VENTURES LLP, TO B OR NOT TO B: AN
INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO B CORPS 12 (Sept. 2015), http://bridgesventures.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/To-B-or-Not-To-B-6-print.pdf [https://perma.cc/72FY-8H5A].
3. Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into
the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 633 (2009); Dana Brakman Reiser,
Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 684 (2014) (“[E]ventually there
will have to be decisions where profit and social good come into conflict and must be traded
off.”).
4. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 91 (2015) (hereinafter Social Enterprise as Commitment) (“One answer
lies in developing governance processes and policies that internalize, express, and selfregulate the social enterprise’s commitment to its social mission.”).
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thresholds to initiate government monitoring.5 As a result, many social
enterprises are in a netherworld of governance6 that has not been previously
analyzed in social enterprise legal scholarship.
The social enterprise sector is an increasingly growing segment of the
U.S. economy.7 Impact investing8 in the social enterprise sector by
institutional investment alone is estimated to be at $46 billion by
conservative figures,9 which is a fraction of the estimated $6.20 trillion in
U.S.-domiciled assets currently committed to socially responsible
investing.10 When an industry crumbles, there are ripple effects far beyond
the immediate companies’ balance sheets, as these events affect customers,
5. Shruti Rana, Philanthropic Innovation and Creative Capitalism: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective on Social Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility,
64 ALA. L. REV. 1121, 1146 (2013) (noting that social enterprises are “operating in a
conceptual and regulatory no-man’s-land . . . where their activities may be regulated only by
the good intentions of their founders and managers . . . .”).
6. Cf. Joseph Stromberg, A sports governance expert explains why FIFA is so corrupt
— and how to fix it, VOX: CULTURE (last updated June 2, 2015, 1:08 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2015/5/27/8671925/how-to-fix-fifa
[https://perma.cc/55RV-S9P7]
(describing how a lack of regulations on international sports associations, such as FIFA and
the Olympics, has placed the associations in a “netherworld of governance”).
7. See Brad Edmondson, The First Benefit Corporation IPO Is Coming, and that’s a
Big Deal, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.triplepundit.com/2016/02/first-benefitcorporation-ipo-coming-thats-big-deal/# [https://perma.cc/4KAY-YFUV] (“If the Laureate
IPO is successful, it will provide a roadmap for institutional investors, family offices and
individual investors who want to invest capital in businesses that generate a good return and
make valuable contributions to society at large . . . . And it will provide a strong
counterpoint to skeptics that believe that businesses cannot access institutional capital unless
they focus exclusively on maximizing value for shareholders.”) (quoting Luke Stephan, Can
Private Equity Help Make Businesses Good?, LINKEDIN (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/can-private-equity-help-make-business-good-lukestephan?trk=hp-feed-article-title-like [https://perma.cc/LU6Q-S8CM]).
8. Impact investing refers to investors that are creating direct social impact through
“targeted direct equity and debt investments in [social businesses] across developed and
emerging markets.” WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR., ET. AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 3–4 (Jan. 18, 2013)
[hereinafter
WHITE
PAPER],
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GXM6-WM2Z].
9. JP MORGAN & GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, SPOTLIGHT ON THE MARKET:
IMPACT
INVESTOR
SURVEY
6
(2014),
THE
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/140502Spotlight_on_the_market-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQJ2-KCR5].
10. US SIF: THE FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, REPORT ON
US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 2014 (2015),
http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R3TPRYS].
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corporate partners, and in some cases even the global economy. Thus,
there are significant economic incentives to making sure the social
enterprise sector is adequately supported.11 More importantly, there are
also societal reasons we want social enterprises, individually and
collectively, to be sustainable institutions. Social enterprises can influence
social change by improving the lives of those marginalized and excluded in
various segments of our society. Socially and environmentally conscious
executives might believe that corporate governance mechanisms are not
necessary for their businesses because those working in the social
enterprise space are not predominately motivated by power and money.12
However, good corporate governance accomplishes more than mitigating
fraud and scandals; it helps companies prevent corporate waste, effectively
manage resources, and adapt to changing realities. For every major media
story of organizational corruption,13 there are many untold stories of small
to mid-size businesses that fail in large part due to a lack of corporate
governance mechanisms. Good corporate governance practices are
necessary for a company’s sustainability, resilience, and scale.14 The longterm social impact goals of social enterprises require that these companies
endure and often necessitate growth to reach their target populations. Thus,
social enterprises need to develop and promote effective corporate
governance across the sector if the promise of the social enterprise
11. See Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing
Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 354 (2007)
(“Corporations are the pivotal store of risk capital in the United States, and the key holder of
society’s wealth. The manner in which corporations are governed will affect a wide range
of national issues—from economic inequality to globalization.”).
12. Corporate law scholars have linked the emergence of the social enterprise sector to
the 2008 financial crisis. See, e.g., Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in
Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States
and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 642-44 (2013)
(describing the resurgence of social enterprise as a result of the 2008 recession).
13. See, e.g., Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for
Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE — OFFICE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS (May 27, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-fivecorporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and [https://perma.cc/8NVL-65J6]
(last updated June 9, 2015). Allegations of FIFA corruption have been an on-going issue for
FIFA. See generally LastWeekTonight, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: FIFA and the
World Cup, YOUTUBE (June 8, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DlJEt2KU33I
[https://perma.cc/AF5Y-RBEV] (describing FIFA as a “comically grotesque organization,”
alleging corruption, and providing clips of other media outlets similarly criticizing FIFA).
14. See Ozden Deniz, The Importance of Corporate Governance for a Well
Functioning Financial System: Reforming Corporate Governance in Developing Countries,
14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 219, 222 (2012) (arguing that “corporate governance is also a public
policy concern” as it enhances local capital markets by attracting investors).
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movement15 is to reach its full potential.
Corporate lawyers16 not only help companies draft the charter
documents that govern the business, they also help companies navigate a
complicated network of organizational documents, state corporate law,
private contracts, and federal and state regulations.17 Each of these factors
contributes to and influences the governance structure of the company. For
this reason, corporate lawyers should have a significant role and lend their
expertise to creating corporate governance models and enforcement
mechanisms in the social enterprise sector.18 Legal scholarship to date on
social enterprises has primarily focused on comparing,19 critiquing,20 and
theorizing21 the new hybrid-entity22 legal forms enacted to accommodate
15. The term “social enterprise movement” is regularly used to describe the increase in
visibility and quantity, in roughly a decade, of businesses that use market strategies to make
social impact. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying
Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 222 (2012) [hereinafter Applying Traditional
Corporate Law].
16. The terms corporate lawyer and transactional lawyer are used interchangeably in
this Article to refer to the practice of law that integrates “the substantive business, financial,
and lawyering skills needed to consummate business transactions.” Susan R. Jones &
Jacqueline Lainez, Enriching the Law School Curriculum: The Rise of Transactional Legal
Clinics in U.S. Law Schools, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 85, 94 (2013). While transactional
lawyering has been used in other lawyering scholarship to describe a broad range of skills
that includes almost any non-litigation-based practice, this Article narrows the use of the
term to the representation of business entities where the legal team interprets, analyzes, and
advises on private ordering, statutes, regulations, and case law to assist their clients in
realizing their organizational goals and business objectives. In the relevant scholarship,
these lawyers are also referred to as deal lawyers.
17. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64
BUS. LAW. 279 (2009) (describing the various tasks and services provided by business
lawyers).
18. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163, 176 (2008) [hereinafter Stop Teaching Dodge] (“When it comes to corporations,
lawyers are ship captains.”).
19. See, e.g., Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise
Frontier, 84 TULANE L. REV. 337, 342-47, 364-76 (2009) (comparing the various business
entities chosen by social entrepreneurs).
20. See, e.g., Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporations: An
Economic Analysis and Recommendations, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1001 (2013) (noting that the
article’s purpose is to “critically analyze[] the benefit corporation’s key elements and pose[]
key questions that create uncertainty for courts to resolve”); Joseph Karl Grant, When
Making Money and Making a Sustainable and Societal Difference Collide: Will Benefit
Corporations Succeed or Fail?, 46 IND. L. REV. 581, 601-03 (2013) (expressing approval of
the changes and growth of benefit corporations).
21. See generally, e.g., Reiser, supra note 3 (theorizing forms of social enterprise).
22. The term “hybrid entity” describes those entities formed under a statute that
recognizes not only the for-profit nature of the enterprise but also the social mission of the
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business commitment to both profit and social impact. This Article
expands guidance to social enterprise practitioners and corporate lawyers
by arguing that the entire sector, not merely hybrid entities, needs to
develop effective governance models and recommending benefit reports as
a self-regulating mechanism the sector should adopt to support the
development of social enterprise governance.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the
corporate governance vacuum in the social enterprise sector and identifies
why it is important for social enterprises to think critically about their
corporate governance practices. Part II summarizes state statutory
governance laws that fail to create adequate systems of accountability.
Federal regulations promote accountability though disclosure requirements,
but these seldom apply to most social enterprises, which are small,
privately owned companies. Thus, the Article argues that the social
enterprise sector should adopt a new mechanism that encourages the
development and maintenance of good corporate governance. Given the
impracticality of expanding government oversight to include small social
enterprises, new governance theory23 provides a framework for
understanding how state governments are facilitating social enterprise
governance through hybrid-corporation legislation. Finally, Part III
outlines how the benefit reporting requirements in hybrid-corporation
statutes can promote the development of social enterprise governance
models. This section concludes with specific recommendations for
corporate lawyers to embed benefit reporting requirements into the DNA of
the social enterprise regardless of the legal form. If social enterprise
practitioners and corporate lawyers collaboratively develop, document, and
disseminate social enterprise governance models through benefit reports,
then this collaboration will lead to a stronger, more resilient social
enterprise sector that is better prepared to traverse the rough terrain towards
sustained social change.
entity, blending the social and profit obligations into one business. This is distinct from a
company structure that includes both for-profit and nonprofit entities within the same
corporate family. See Ross Kelley, Note, The Emerging Need for Hybrid Entities: Why
California Should Become the Delaware of “Social Enterprise Law”, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
619, 635 (2014) (“Recognizing the limitations and restraints posed on socially geared forprofit organizations, several states have begun to develop a legislative model that blends
attributes of traditional for-profit and nonprofit entities into ‘hybrid’ organizations.”).
23
The term “new governance theory” describes a paradigm shift from top-down, commandand-control regulation to collaborative governance systems. New governance theory rests
on the premise that the state alone cannot effectuate societal change and that it therefore
needs to engage with private actors to leverage their expertise in dynamic and complex
contexts. See infra Part II.B.

926

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
I.

[Vol. 18:4

SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND HYBRID ENTITIES

This section unpacks the term “social enterprise” and explores the rise
of hybrid-entity legislation in the development of the social enterprise
sector. This part also explains the various contributions that hybrid-entity
statutes have already made to expand and strengthen the social enterprise
sector. It concludes by remarking that social enterprise governance
remains underdeveloped, notwithstanding these new business forms.
A. The Emergence of Social Enterprises
The term “social enterprise” does not have a precise definition and as
such, while often used, it is also commonly misunderstood. The term is
evolving as it continues to be refined and contoured by business and legal
practitioners and scholars.24 As the term suggests,25 it describes those
business enterprises that intentionally impact societal good.26 Precise
24. Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, What is a “Social” Business and Why Does the
Answer Matter?, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 278, 279 (2014) (arguing that the
definitions for “social enterprise” remains “hopelessly fractured” and “often conflicting”);
see also J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347 (2014) (identifying that the term “social
enterprise” is not well defined in the academic literature).
25. Similar to terms such as social worker, social justice, and social change, the word
“social” in the term “social enterprise” is a qualifier that focuses on vulnerable populations
to the benefit of the greater society. William P. Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested
in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 7, 13-14 (2007) (“One good working
definition of ‘social justice’ is the commitment to act with and on behalf of those who are
suffering because of social neglect, social decisions or social structures and institutions.”);
Reiser, supra note 3, at 693-94 (identifying “social good” as an intentionally vague and
contested term allowing founders the flexibility “necessary to produce a vibrant and
pluralistic civil society.”).
26. MUHANNAD YUNUS WITH KARL WEBER, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW
KIND OF CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS xvii (2010)
(defining social business as dedicated entirely to achieving a social goal) (emphasis added).
But see Brenda Massetti, The Duality of Social Enterprise: A Framework for Social Action,
REV. BUS., Winter 2012/2013, at 59 (defining social enterprises as “an organization where
the majority of its social actions: (1) are congruent with the organization’s mission and have
some degree of social legitimacy; (2) are community internalizing regardless of whether
they are required or chosen; (3) make clear social contributions while producing financial
contributions (i.e. profits) that exceed their resource consumption” (emphasis added)
(endnote omitted)). In a report to the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund (REDF),
Mathematica Policy Research defines social enterprises as “mission-driven businesses
focused on hiring and assisting people who face barriers to work.” DANA ROTZ ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND LIFE STABILITY ONE YEAR AFTER STARTING A SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE JOB xv (2015), http://redf.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/REDFMJS-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH2Y-9QA6].
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definitions matter because there is misuse27 and confusion28 about how
business ventures are determined to be social enterprises.29
The
definitional variations are diverse enough to inspire a semester-long course
I teach aimed at better understanding the meaning of the term social
enterprise.30 As Marc Lane points out, because the term “social good” is so
broad, virtually “every business corporation and every charity could fairly
be characterized as a social enterprise. After all, businesses employ people,
fulfill the needs and wants of their customers, and pay taxes. Similarly,
charities provide altruistic and humanitarian services that would otherwise
be performed by government or not at all.”31 Several accepted definitions
of social enterprise narrow down the concept. The Social Enterprise
Alliance,32 a leading organization in the sector, defines social enterprises as
“businesses whose primary purpose is the common good. They use the
methods and disciplines of business and the power of the marketplace to
advance their social, environmental and human justice agendas.”33 On the
other hand, Professors Roger Martin and Sally Osberg’s definition of social
entrepreneurship34 focuses on the target market that the enterprise seeks to
27. See, e.g., Jim Schorr & Kevin Lynch, Preserving the Meaning of Social Enterprise,
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Sept.
14,
2012),
STAN.
http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/preserving_the_meaning_of_social_enterprise
[https://perma.cc/PT8V-W27S] (documenting how Salesforce.com “began using the term
‘social enterprise’ to describe ‘how social and mobile cloud technologies are empowering
companies to connect with customers, partners, and employees in entirely new ways’”).
28. See M. Tina Dacin et al., Social Entrepreneurship: A Critique and Future
Directions, 22 ORG. SCI. 1203, 1203 (2011) (“[A]s a nascent field, social entrepreneurship
scholars are in the midst of debates involving definitional and conceptual clarity . . . .”).
29. See Schorr & Lynch, supra note 27 (“For years, this new realm of hybrid ventures
has struggled to define itself in a cohesive way, and the lack of a general consensus on
terminology in this arena has been a constraint on the development of social capital markets,
supportive policy environments, and other key pieces of the ecosystem needed to catalyze
the growth of the field.”).
30. Social Enterprise & Empowerment Clinic, THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/clinicalprograms/clinics/socialenterpriseandeconomicempowerment/index.php
[https://perma.cc/6ZD3-MCQQ] (last visited May 9, 2016).
31. MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION DRIVEN
ENTREPRENEURS 6 (2011).
32. Social Enterprise Alliance is a membership organization for social enterprises with
local chapters across the United States. For more information, see the About Social
Enterprise
Alliance
page,
SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE
ALLIANCE,
https://www.sealliance.org/about#ourrole [https://perma.cc/Z7U9-C358] (last visited May 9, 2016).
33. LARRY D. WATSON & RICHARD A. HOEFER, DEVELOPING NONPROFIT AND HUMAN
SERVICE LEADERS: ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS 4 (2014) (reproducing the definition
provided by Social Enterprise Alliance, which definition no longer appears on the Social
Enterprise Alliance Website as of May 9, 2016).
34. “Social entrepreneurship,” a term that is at times used interchangeably with the
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serve and makes the meaning of social change more explicit:
We define social entrepreneurship as having the following three
components: (1) identifying a stable but inherently unjust
equilibrium that causes the exclusion, marginalization, or
suffering of a segment of humanity that lacks the financial means
or political clout to achieve any transformative benefit on its
own; (2) identifying an opportunity in this unjust equilibrium,
developing a social value proposition, and bringing to bear
inspiration, creativity, direct action, courage, and fortitude,
thereby challenging the stable state’s hegemony; and (3) forging
a new, stable equilibrium that releases trapped potential or
alleviates the suffering of the targeted group, and through
imitation and the creation of a stable ecosystem around the new
equilibrium ensuring a better future for the targeted group and
even society at large.35

More generically, Professor Filipe M. Santos defines social enterprises
to be those businesses with a predominant strategic focus on value
creation36 over value capture37,38 which explains why social enterprises are
often in the business of providing services to socially neglected populations
because that is where the potential for value creation is highest. Professor
Dana Reiser concisely summarizes her general idea of a social enterprise as
“an organization formed to achieve social goals using business methods.”39
Another working definition of social enterprises are those for-profit
businesses whose primary objective is to make social impact and nonprofits
that incorporate market-based, commercial strategies to achieve their
mission.40 Social enterprises often operate at the intersection of profitterm “social enterprise,” is often the act of running or managing a social enterprise. But see,
e.g., Raymond Dart, The Legitimacy of Social Enterprise, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. &
LEADERSHIP 411 (2004) (using the terms “social enterprise” and “social entrepreneurship”
interchangeably). Social entrepreneurs are those founders of social enterprise.
35. Roger L. Martin & Sally Osberg, Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for
Definition,
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.,
Spring
2007,
at
35,
http://ssir.org/images/articles/2007SP_feature_martinosberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XWPYGMR].
36. Filipe M. Santos, A Positive Theory of Social Entrepreneurship, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS
335, 337 (2012) (defining value creation as the aggregate increase in utility of society’s
members after accounting for the opportunity cost of all the resources used in that activity).
37. Id. (defining value capture as the portion of value created by the activity after
accounting for the cost of resources that the focal actor mobilized).
38. Id. at 339; See also LANE, supra note 31, at 4 (defining social enterprises “as one
not motivated by profit, in that any profit motive takes a back seat to a mission centered on
curing an acute social malady”).
39. Reiser, supra note 3, at 681.
40. See LANE, supra note 31, at 7 (noting that social enterprises are “thinking about
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generating enterprises and social change organizations. Realizing that a
social enterprise is either a for-profit or a nonprofit challenges assumptions
about both sectors of business. It is necessary to emphasize that the term
describes more than the archetypical charity that often comes to mind. The
nonprofit social enterprise may have a business model that is most
commonly used in for-profit businesses. One example is an e-commerce
company that uses an online platform to market and sell artisan crafts. It is
also equally important to understand that companies formed as traditional
for-profit entities can effectively operate as social enterprises. Newcomers
to the social enterprise field tend to associate the term social enterprise with
nonprofits exclusively. The for-profit social enterprise should have a
clearly articulated mission that could make it eligible for federal taxexemption, as its business income is substantially related to a tax-exempt
purpose. Thus, for many social enterprises, the company could have easily
chosen to be formed as a for-profit entity or a nonprofit corporation.

The common theme in each of the aforementioned definitions is that a
substantial variety of business models and legal entity forms are contained
within the social enterprise sector, from traditional for-profits to nonprofits
to hybrid entities. Although social enterprises have existed for more than a
century,41 recent hybrid-entity legislation has catapulted the social
social impact every day and, in that quest, are going about the serious business of applying
strategic planning and management tools to social causes”).
41. See About Us, GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, INC., http://www.goodwill.org/about-us/
(quoting founder Rev. Edgar J. Helms as describing Goodwill, founded in 1902 and today a
$4 billion nonprofit, as an “industrial program as well as a social service enterprise . . . a
provider of employment, training and rehabilitation for people of limited employability, and
a source of temporary assistance for individuals whose resources were depleted”); see also
Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of
a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 211-17 (2010) (describing Ben & Jerry’s
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enterprise movement to national attention and given new visibility to the
growing sector.42 While the type of legal entity is an important part of
understanding how a social enterprise can form, on a day-to-day basis
corporate governance is also essential to determining the success of the
social enterprise.43 As the following case studies exemplify, achieving a
social mission requires thought and guidance regarding the corporate
governance structure of the social enterprise.
1. Case Study #1: Social Mission Achieved through Governance
Imagine a social enterprise that has the primary goal of using
professional, long-term employment to empower its individual employees
to disrupt cycles of poverty, substance abuse, and recidivism. This social
enterprise is formed as a limited liability company (LLC) to allow the
managers to raise capital from outside investors and the flexibility to
operate the company in a manner that best supports the company mission.
The core purpose of the company is not to simply employ but to restore
dignity to its employees. The managers of the LLC, thus, want the
employees to be involved in various operational decisions that will affect
their work and the direction of the business. For example, employees are
expected to provide insight on management structure, new software,
expansion of product offerings, and employee scheduling. Employees are
encouraged to provide feedback and share ideas about what the company
should be doing better.
Thus, systematic employee participation in the operations of the
company is a fundamental aspect of how the company seeks to achieve its
social mission. Engaging employees in a transparent, democratic process is
a significant means to achieving the enterprise’s social mission of
employee empowerment. Yet, at the entity formation stage, the company
Homemade, Inc. as an iconic social enterprises in the early 1980s with a double-bottom line
business model, which they called “double-dip,” was well known for its commitment to
prioritizing progressive social goals over profits).
42. See HEERAD SABETI WITH THE FOURTH SECTOR NETWORK CONCEPT WORKING
GROUP, THE EMERGING FOURTH SECTOR: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2009),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/4th%20sector%20paper
%20-%20exec%20summary%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HT9-DC9A] (“The Fourth
Sector is emerging organically, the collective result of thousands upon thousands of
initiatives at the individual organizational level.”).
43. See Renatto Garcia, Comment, Re-Engineering Georgia’s Corporate DNA: A
Benefit Analysis and Practicality Assessment for Benefit Corporation Legislation in
Georgia, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 627, 677 (2013) (identifying that the social enterprise “formula
is far from perfect, giving rise to criticisms about conflicts of interest and the latent
inefficiency of considering multiple stakeholder interests”).
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was provided no legal counsel on how to establish a governance system
through which employees would participate in operational decisions. As a
result, the company engages in ad hoc employee voting and collects
irregular feedback from the employees. The employees do not have
consistent access to financial reports and company documents to inform
their feedback. A key component of the company’s social mission is to be
accomplished through innovative, decision-making structures and
processes; yet the company has no format through which to implement this
social mission. Without an established governance system uniquely
designed to engage the employees in decision-making, there is no
mechanism for determining if the company is achieving its social mission.
Moreover, even when employees have ad hoc opportunities to provide
meaningful contributions, they lack the information necessary to keep the
managers accountable to the social mission of the company.44 Thus, this
social enterprise that seeks to empower employees through democratic
participation in decision-making has yet to disrupt the default “feedback
loop that breeds . . . hubris at the senior executive levels”45 and
marginalizes employee perspectives.
2. Case Study #2: Balancing Stakeholder Participation through
Governance
Imagine another social enterprise with the mission to reduce hunger in
densely populated cities by connecting businesses with excess food to food
banks, shelters, and other nonprofits who will distribute the food to
individuals in need. The company is formed as a traditional, for-profit
corporation with outside shareholders and generates income by charging a
subscription fee to businesses to pick up and drop off their excess food.
The social enterprise provides logistical support to ensure that its business
customers receive donation receipts so they can track their annual
charitable giving.
Consistent with traditional corporate governance
practices, the board is composed of executives and investor representatives.
Thus, the company is in regular contact with and must be responsive to
investors and its business customers. However, the mission of the social
enterprise is to reduce hunger, not merely to provide pick-up services for
businesses with excess food. The traditional board composition of
44. See Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 351, 366 (2011) (“[F]ew outside parties are capable of meaningfully
critiquing and checking executive decisions, given the economic and organizational
advantages of corporate officers.”).
45. Id. at 376.
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management and investor representation “is procedurally designed to
maximize shareholder wealth,”46 not innovate to end food insecurity. 47
To maintain its ingenuity, the company will need to gather and
incorporate feedback and ideas generated from the end-users of the service
— i.e., individuals suffering from food insecurity and, perhaps, the
nonprofit food distributors.48 How well this for-profit social enterprise
gathers and incorporates information from its end-users will determine its
success at developing new avenues to reduce hunger. However, questions
remain regarding obtaining the end-user feedback and how to incorporate it
with investor interests, especially where the feedback and the investor
interests conflict.
This social enterprise needs a mechanism for
determining how it will collect various interests from its stakeholders and
balance those interests where they do not align. A well thought-out
corporate governance policy and information structure would likely make a
significant difference for this social enterprise because the balancing of
these stakeholder interests is vital to the long-term sustainability of this
company.
B. Current Governance Vacuum
Most social enterprises are not hybrid entities49 but are formed as
traditional for-profit companies or nonprofit corporations.
Social
enterprises are not required under the current governance regime to
regularly evaluate and critically examine their corporate governance
practices. While some federal and state standards of corporate governance
46. Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 20, at 1004.
47. See Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and
Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 247 (1999) (“[T]he optimistic idea that the rich can
gain while helping the disadvantaged has meant in practice that the priorities of the
empowered take over those of the disempowered even in the very programs which were
meant to mitigate this general trend.”).
48. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 43-44 (1978) (“Organizations
could not survive if they were not responsive to the demands from their environment. But,
we have noted that demands often conflict and that response to the demands of one group
constrains the organization in its future actions, including responding to the demands of
others. This suggests that organizations cannot survive by responding completely to every
environmental demand. The interesting issue then becomes the extent to which
organizations can and should respond to various environmental demands, or the conditions
under which one social unit is able to obtain compliance with its demands. By
understanding the conditions of the social control of organizations, we believe it is possible
to understand how organizations decide to comply with, or attempt to avoid, influence.”).
49. See Plerhoples, supra note 4, at 90 (“[A] small cohort of hybrid entities have
incorporated in numerous states.”).
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are already established, there are few mechanisms for ensuring that social
enterprises adhere to these standards. Most for-profit social enterprises are
closely-held companies that might not rise to the level that would require
scrutiny from federal regulatory agencies or state attorneys general. Thus,
it is not surprising that there is a vacuum of corporate governance practices
in the social enterprise sector even though, for many of these companies,
their governance is a means to achieving their social mission.
1. For-Profit Social Enterprises Not Subject to External Oversight
Pursuing profit-making and a social mission does not always lead to
the same business decisions.50
“Blended value, . . . [after all], could easily remain purely
aspirational . . . [as] pursuing profit and social good will not
always lead in the same direction . . . . Even if the stars align at
the outset, eventually there will have to be decisions where profit
and social good come into conflict and must be traded off.”51

Therefore, for-profit social enterprises must be diligent in how they reach
business decisions and transparent about documenting their decisionmaking processes. However, there are few oversight mechanisms that hold
a social enterprise accountable for documenting these decisions and good
corporate governance.
State laws establish the basic framework of distributing
responsibilities within the company52 but are not sufficient to ensure that
the flow of power is properly maintained in the best interest of the
company.53 Outside monitoring from government agents is often required
to hold companies accountable to good governance practices. For example,
the federal government monitors and enforces corporate governance
practices through disclosure requirements that are in place to ensure that
boards and managers follow the law.54 In the wake of global financial

50.
51.
52.
53.

Reiser, supra note 3, at 684.
Id.
See infra Part II.A.
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 71 (2008) (“[T]he institution of the board of directors, as we know it, is not a
reliable corporate governance device. [Even if the] [b]oards of directors will not inevitably
fail in the task of objectively monitoring management . . . [t]hey cannot . . . be expected to
succeed reliably.”).
54. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1914) (1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
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crises and high profile events such as the collapse of Enron,55 the federal
government has been increasingly focused on minimizing risky financial
transactions and improving the corporate governance of large corporations.
Federal reforms such as the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002, commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (“SOX”),56 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)57 are aimed at improving the
corporate governance of large corporations.
SOX imposes new
responsibilities on corporate management, requirements for auditing firms,
requirements for financial transactions, and procedures for conflicts of
interests.58 The law focuses on requiring independent directors and
established board processes.59 Under SOX, “directors can also face
criminal liability for fraudulently influencing, coercing, or misleading an
accounting firm during an audit, with the intention of rendering the audit
report misleading.”60 Less than a decade later, in 2010, Congress enacted
55. Leading up to the demise of Enron, “[c]ompany executives created high
expectations among investors regarding the company’s growth potential and their unique
skill-set to reach it, producing for a time an extraordinarily high stock market valuation.
Meanwhile, the economic reality was turning out to be more sobering. Increasingly
aggressive, apparently fraudulent, steps were taken to report financial results and conditions
that would not deflate investors’ expectations in a way that would put the managers’ jobs,
compensation and perquisites – not to mention social status and self-esteem – immediately
at risk.” Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection:
The SEC and Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2003).
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745-810 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
57. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
58. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 132–34 (2002)(noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 changes the oversight of auditing firms and strengthens auditing standards);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 920 (2003)(identifying auditors, accountants,
corporate officers, lawyers, securities analysts, credit rating agencies, and investment banks,
among other groups, as designated for study or regulation by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002).
59. Another benefit of independent directors is that their outside perspectives can
“serve as valuable advisers to the board and management about the company’s market,
geographic, and product directions.” SPENCERSTUART, SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2014
3
(2014),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/Spencer_Stuart_Board_Index_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S456-MLLA].
60. Stephen Glove & Robert Treuhold, Corporate governance and directors’ duties in
the
United
States:
overview,
PRACTICAL LAW CO.
(Feb.
1,
2013),
http://us.practicallaw.com/9-502-3346 (last visited May 9, 2016).
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Dodd-Frank, which was “the most ambitious attempt since the New Deal
legislation of the 1930s to regulate and reform not only the financial
services industry, but also corporate governance.”61 For example, Section
972 requires public companies to disclose in their annual proxy statements
why they have or have not chosen to separate the roles of chairman and
chief executive officer.62 These regulations, for good reason, do not apply
to non-publically traded companies. As a result, the primary federal
legislation aimed at improving corporate governance is not applicable to
most for-profit social enterprises, which are relatively small businesses.
The federal government also enforces good corporate governance for
companies that issue securities through disclosure requirements under the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).63 Securities regulation
helps create a strong marketplace by promoting integrity in corporate
governance and financial reporting. The SEC regulates the securities
industry, establishes disclosure requirements for corporations, and regulates
communications between the board and shareholders.
U.S. public
corporations are required to disclose a wide range of information in annual
and quarterly reports, as well as in the proxy statements.64 A company’s
annual report filed with the SEC contains, among other items, an internal
control report that must state the responsibility of management for
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting and identify the framework used by
management to evaluate the effectiveness of the corporation’s internal
controls.65 Any director who makes or causes the making of any false or
misleading statement in a document filed with the SEC can be held
personally liable for the misstatement.66
It is unlikely that private companies, not otherwise required to, would
implement these specific reporting procedures because the corporate
governance requirements “are a jumble of [various] statues, rules, forms
and schedules”67 that the average company would not be able to decipher
61. Jonathan F. Foster, Another View: Improving Corporate Governance, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Jun. 11, 2010, 11:10 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/anotherview-how-to-improve-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/54LV-NBE6].
62. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-210, §972, 124 Stat. 1915 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-2).
63. See Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious” and reaffirming that SEC rulemaking requires strong empirical evidence to justify the costs and benefits of the rule).
64. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3 (2015).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
67. Gregory S. Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public
Company Disclosure and the Mythical Duties To Correct and Update, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.

936

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18:4

without sophisticated legal representation.68
Moreover, the federal
monitoring and enforcement system should not be expanded to all social
enterprises given limited government resources and the potential financial
burden federal reporting would place on the social enterprise sector.
To the extent that most social enterprises are raising capital, it is likely
through private placement transactions that are exempt from federal
securities registration requirements. Social enterprises are likely to have a
limited number of shareholders with whom management has close
relationships and who believe in the mission of the enterprise. In theory,
shareholders monitor the decisions of corporate boards,69 often by reference
to corporate earnings. However, active shareholder monitoring may be less
likely for social enterprises because corporate earnings and profit metrics
are not the only indicators of business success. As a result, below market
indicators may not give raise to shareholder scrutiny into the corporate
practices.
For these reasons, there are limited internal and regulatory controls
encouraging small, for-profit social enterprises to adopt good corporate
governance practices. In the absence of legal requirements, companies are
not likely to prioritize or see the value in thinking deeply about corporate
governance issues. However, for-profit social enterprises would greatly
benefit from documenting their governance practices and working to
innovate unique governance models. Corporate reporting would help
social enterprises better articulate how their competitive edge is achieving
both their profit and social outcomes. As traditional businesses are
increasingly moving into recording their own social impact,70 social
2199, 2199 (2000).
68. Regulatory compliance is also expensive. Public companies expend a significant
amount of capital resources on complying with SOX, for example, and that cost of
compliance continues to rise. A majority, fifty-eight percent, of large public companies
surveyed estimated they spent more than $1 million on SOX compliance in 2014 alone.
PROTIVITI, INC., SOX COMPLIANCE – CHANGES ABOUND AMID DRIVE FOR STABILITY AND
LONG-TERM
VALUE
6
(May
2015),
http://www.protiviti.com/enUS/Documents/Surveys/2015-SOX-Compliance-Survey-Protiviti.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GV7W-YKGR].
69. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1019–
23 (noting that shareholder primacy is a weak accountability mechanism for for-profit
corporations). But see George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance Without Shareholders:
A Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 114-16
(2014) (arguing that shareholder primacy is the foundational accountability mechanism for
good corporate governance).
70. See, e.g., 2015 Corporate Social Responsibility Report, CISCO,
http://csr.cisco.com/pages/csr-reports [https://perma.cc/25ZQ-HAJ3] (last visited May 9,
2016) (providing links to corporate social responsibility reports); Sustainability Report
2014/15, FORD (2015), http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2014-
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enterprises have faced increasing competition for investment dollars and
customer attention.
For many social enterprises, their competitive
advantage is the theory of social change within their business model. But
to maintain their momentum, social enterprises will need to remain at the
forefront of crafting and disseminating their social impact narrative.71 As
experts in the field have observed, there is “more bleed between social
enterprises and traditional businesses,”72 meaning they are each
increasingly taking on the characteristics of the other. This requires social
enterprises to be more cost effective than their traditional peers in creating
and articulating social change.73 If social enterprises can articulate and
measure their social impact over time in a systematic way that could
significantly improve their ability to attract funding.74 Therefore, the
measurement of the social impact through a reporting process is
fundamental to the long-term financial health of a for-profit social
enterprise regardless of the type of legal entity.
2. Nonprofit Social Enterprises Lack Internal Oversight
A significant number of social enterprises are formed as nonprofits.
“Contrary to popular belief, private philanthropy is not the main source of
nonprofit revenue; rather, over forty percent of nonprofit revenue is derived
from fees for services performed.”75 In part, because of the steadily
15/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y8F5-678L] (last visited May 9, 2016) (reporting on its
corporate sustainability in 2014/2015); Performance with Purpose: Sustainability Reporting,
PEPSICO,
http://www.pepsico.com/Purpose/Performance-with-Purpose/SustainabilityReporting [https://perma.cc/DJC7-BLJX] (last visited May 9, 2016) (providing links to
sustainability reports).
71. See Claudia Cahalane, Social enterprises must continue momentum in social impact
reporting, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/socialenterprise-network/2012/oct/10/social-enterprise-momentum-impact-reporting
[https://perma.cc/LAB6-2BCW] (“[S]ocial enterprises need[] to get involved with shaping
existing and emerging tools for reporting”).
72. Id.
73. See John Anner, Jessica Alba and the Impact of Social Enterprise, STAN. SOC.
REV.
(Sept.
26,
2014),
INNOVATION
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/jessica_alba_and_the_impact_of_social_enterprise
[https://perma.cc/ZQ4Z-VY7N] (“[W]ith 28 million small and medium enterprises in
America, benefit corporations need to stand out from the crowd on the basis of their added
social value.”).
74. Reiser, supra note 3, at 684. (“Social entrepreneurs want to convey to investors that
their entities will provide a different and better overall return — doing more for investors’
pocketbooks than a charitable donation and more for their souls than an ordinary stock or
bond.”).
75. Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit
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decreasing government support and limited philanthropic dollars in grants,
nonprofits have increasingly looked to market-based strategies and revenue
streams to cover their operation costs.76 As a result, a sizeable percentage
of nonprofits are also social enterprises, because they use market-based
strategies to pursue or sustain their charitable purpose.77 The blurred lines
of a nonprofit with a business enterprise means that nonprofit directors
often have many of the same corporate responsibilities as for-profit
directors but generally with less financial resources and often no
compensation for their time and effort.
Thus, it is not surprising that the nonprofit sector often comes under
scrutiny for failings of corporate governance.78 Scandals within the
nonprofit sector illustrate that good intentions are not sufficient to replace
good governance practices.79 The “ineffectiveness of nonprofit corporate
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 929 (2003).
76. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 457 (“[A]
distinction [between nonprofits and for-profit corporations] long believed to be a difference
of kind turns out to be a difference of degree.”); Karen A. Froelich Diversification of
Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations, 28
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 246, 246 (1999).
77. “A recent Bridgespan Group survey of nonprofit executives found that half of these
practitioners expected that earned income would play an important role in their
organizations’ future.” Jim Schorr, Social Enterprise 2.0: Moving Towards a Sustainable
Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2006, at 12, http://communitywealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/article-schorr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BYF5-9KYJ].
78. See Chongmyong Lee & Branda Nowell, A Framework for Assessing the
Performance of Nonprofit Organizations, 36 AM. J. EVALUATION 299, 299 (2015) (“As a
result of a growing emphasis on accountability in government funding, nonprofits are under
increasing pressure to demonstrate excellence in performance in order to secure financial
resources similar to their public and private counterparts.”); see, e.g., Michael McDonald &
Brian Chappatta, Madoff Haunts Yeshiva as University Slides to Junk: Muni Credit,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2014, 9:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0122/madoff-haunts-yeshiva-as-university-slides-to-junk-muni-credit [https://perma.cc/G4VAUUED] (quoting a Moody’s analyst explaining why Moody’s Investors Service cut the
university’s rating to an unprecedented four levels below investment grade, “‘It’s about their
management.’”); Philip Rucker, United Way Fundraising Rises after Scandal-Induced
Plunge, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/11/29/AR2007112902007.html
[https://perma.cc/G568-PCUP]
(describing how corporate executive theft and mismanagement led to lost fundraising and a
damaged reputation); Stephanie Strom & Campbell Robertson, As Its Coffers Swell, Red
Cross is Criticized on Gulf Coast Response, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/us/nationalspecial/as-its-coffers-swell-red-cross-iscriticized-on-gulf-coast-response.html [https://perma.cc/8E3N-Q9QU] (describing the
public’s frustration with the Red Cross’s practice of not fully utilizing donations designated
for particular relief, but instead allocating those funds to other programs).
79. See Faith Rivers James, Nonprofit Pluralism and the Public Trust: Constructing a
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governance and the virtual absence of accountability constraints” has not
gone without considerable criticism.80 Calls for governance reform within
the nonprofit sector have not made much impact in part because nonprofit
corporate governance operates without much government oversight.81 The
limited law on nonprofit corporate governance is fragmented primarily
between corporate law and tax law.82 Because of the business structure and
nonprofit corporate law statutes, directors of nonprofit social enterprises
have fiduciary duties that mirror the obligations of for-profit directors.83
While nonprofit directors are held to high standards as stewards of assets
dedicated to the public benefit,84 they are provided with little guidance for
how to implement organizational oversight.
Professor George Dent argues that nonprofit corporate governance is
less effective than for-profit corporate governance in part because nonprofit
directors do not know what directorship entails, and, as a result, the CEO,
not directors, governs the nonprofit with little oversight.85 Nonprofit
directors often have insufficient information to make informed decisions
and provide executive oversight and evaluation. The existence of
shareholders in a for-profit business is a means to the ends of information
Transparent, Accountable, and Culturally Competent Board Governance Paradigm, 9
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 94, 96 (2012)(noting that poor governance has contributed to the
perception that the independent sector should improve the governance model).
80. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers:
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 653 (1998).
81. See James, supra note 79, at 95 (noting that nonprofits still operate in an
independent manner, “outside of heavy government control”); see also Thomas H. Boyd,
Note, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-For-Profit Corporation
Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 741-42 (1987) (explaining that the New York statute
specifically addresses the board’s “power to make and retain investments on behalf of the
corporation”).
82. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate
Governance — A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 347, 351 (2012) (“There is no single unified body of law that applies to charities
and other nonprofits. Instead, the law in this area is fragmented . . . . Instead, the law
regulating nonprofit and charitable governance remains an amalgam of trust law, corporate
law, and tax law.”).
83. Id. at 356.
84. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place.”).
85. See, George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance Without Shareholders: A
Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 99-100 (2014)
(discussing why nonprofit boards frequently do not govern); see also Evelyn Brody, The
Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Between Law and Practice,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521, 534 (2007) (“In the case of nonprofits, some observers believe
that the absence of shareholders emphasizes an inappropriate reversal of the power
relationship between the board and the officers.”).
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generation because for-profit corporations have to produce regular annual
reports and provide disclosures to shareholders. Professor Dent argues that
shareholder governance works particularly well because shareholders have
a variety of enforcement tools at their disposal.86 Regardless of how
unlikely shareholders are to use these enforcement tools,87 Professor Dent
argues that the possibility of litigation serves as an effective accountability
mechanism.88 While he is particularly negative about the quality of
nonprofit governance, Professor Dent admits that similar poor governance
characteristics are also found in for-profit companies.89 While helpful in
identifying the shortcomings within nonprofit governance, it is clear that
these issues are not unique to the nonprofit sector.90 Thus, Dent establishes
the existence of a correlation between poor corporate governance and no
shareholders without establishing that no shareholders causes poor
governance. Professor Dent’s analysis, for example, does not compare the
governance practices between nonprofits and for-profit companies that
have similar operating budgets. One would likely find even more
governance similarities between nonprofits and for-profits with similar
operating budgets than Professor Dent acknowledges in this article. If
nonprofits had a mechanism for regularly producing information and
disseminating it to directors, then this would address many of the
86. See Dent, supra note 85, at 108 (describing how shareholders use the threat of a
policy resolution for shareholder vote to “generate[] publicity that criticizes management.”).
87. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1644 (2001)
(explaining that shareholder wealth maximization is a non-legally enforceable rule because
of the judiciary’s hesitation to question business judgments); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.
L. REV., 547, 573 (2003) (“Shareholders exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day
operations or long-term policy.”); Lin, supra note 44, at 367 (“[M]any institutional
shareholders lack proper economic incentives and organizing mechanisms to meaningfully
engage in shareholder activism.”).
88. See Dent, supra note 85, at 108-09 (“The outside directors may not feel much of a
personal stake in these battles; they may be unwilling to wage a public campaign against the
shareholders just to preserve the privileges of the managers.”).
89. Id. at 106–108 (noting the possibility that “the board’s self-selected slate of
nominees [can run] unopposed,” that “most directors who have failed to obtain a majority
[shareholder] vote remain in their positions,” and that shareholder policy resolutions “often
fail, and even when approved they are usually not binding on the board.”). See also
Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 525 (2005) (“For a while it
was hoped that the condition of shareholder powerlessness would be remedied by the rise of
institutional shareholders . . . . Unfortunately, this has not exactly worked . . . . The end
result . . . is that the modern corporation is essentially a self-perpetuating oligarchy of
managers largely immune from input by shareholders, employees, and directors.”).
90. Dent, supra note 85, at 112-13 (comparing nonprofit boards to the functioning of
large public companies).

2016]

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNMENT

941

governance weaknesses that Dent identifies. In other words, it may be the
collection of information and thoughtful review of company performance at
various levels that creates a divide in company performance, not
shareholder governance versus nonprofit governance as Dent posits.
Many of the suggested measures for improving nonprofit boards also
serve as critiques of for-profit boards. The common recommendations for
nonprofit boards include the carefully planned division of authority,91 clear
definition of organizational goals, and standards for review of executive
performance.92 Implementing these suggestions would depend on the
volition of the directors, as there is no external force to compel their
adoption.93 State attorneys general have the authority to oversee charitable
organizations within their jurisdictions to prevent the mismanagement of
the public’s donations. However, they exert limited influence on nonprofit
governance and often intervene late to resolve nonprofit issues.94 The
California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 (the “Integrity Act”),95 for
example, was an extension of the federal corporate governance
resurgence;96 it requires that any charity registered with the California
Office of the Attorney General, receiving annual gross revenues of $2
million or more, must form an audit committee.97 The goal of the Integrity
Act is to increase the scrutiny of high asset nonprofits, which account for a
significant amount of wealth within this country.98 However, these
91. JOHN TROPMAN & THOMAS J. HARVEY, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE WHY, WHAT,

AND HOW OF NONPROFIT BOARDSHIP 7–9 (2009).
92. DENNIS D. POINTER & JAMES E. ORLIKOFF,

THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE BOARD:
PRINCIPLES OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION GOVERNANCE 23–79 (2002).
93. See Nicole Gilkeson, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should States
Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions Onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831, 852–53
(2007) (noting that under-enforcement of nonprofit regulation in California will likely
continue due to the limited resources of the California Attorney General).
94. See Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967)
(acknowledging the multiple duties of Attorney General’s office which necessarily make
nonprofit oversight sporadic and neglected).
95. California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, 2004 CAL. STAT. 919 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE and CAL. GOV’T CODE).
96. Gilkeson, supra note 93, at 847 (“The California Act is ineffective because it relies
on a solution tailored for the for-profit sector—auditing requirements—instead of crafting a
solution to address issues in the nonprofit sector.”).
97. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586(e)(2) (2005).
98. The nonprofit sector contributed an estimated $984.9 billion of the U.S. economy
in 2015, composing 5.4 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. National Data:
National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 1.3.5: Gross Value Added by Sector,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS tbl. 1.3.5,
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=2
4 [https://perma.cc/5YDK-8QB6] (last visited June 6, 2016); see also Nonprofits Worth
$887.3 Billion to U.S. Economy, NONPROFIT TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014),
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financial audit requirements only apply to large nonprofits and are unlikely
to influence the governance of emerging nonprofit social enterprises.
Perhaps the most significant agency for influencing nonprofit
corporate governance is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which
determines at the federal level whether a nonprofit qualifies for tax-exempt
status.
Through the application of the Internal Revenue Code’s
requirements for federal recognition of tax-exemption and the annual
income tax reporting requirement, the IRS “attempts to reduce the potential
for conflict of interest transactions by requiring disclosure of insider
relationships, questioning relationships, and agreements that might result in
excess benefit transactions, and explicitly suggesting that organizational
bylaws include a comprehensive conflict of interest provision.”99 While
helpful, outside of these limited circumstances, nonprofit social enterprises
are not counseled on how to balance and manage competing interests
within a sustainable business. Arguments have been made for how
voluntary clubs can complement and support enforcement of legal and
regulatory obligations on nonprofit directors.100 Professor Brakman Reiser,
for example, argues that while financial disclosure standards are the most
developed for nonprofits, there is still a lack of enforcement of governance
and mission accountability post nonprofit incorporation.101 “Performance
measurement in the nonprofit sector is complicated by the fact that
nonprofits often pursue missions whose achievement is difficult to
measure.”102 In short, there are few tools for monitoring and supporting
nonprofits governance.103 Thus, nonprofit social enterprises would greatly
benefit from a mechanism by which to document and refine their corporate
governance.
C. The Rise of Hybrid-Entity Legislation
Laws to support the growth of the social enterprise sector have
focused almost exclusively on developing new legal entity forms. Starting
http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/nonprofits-worth-887-3-billion-u-seconomy/ [https://perma.cc/8CX8-75H9] (“The tax-exempt sector in the United States
represented 5.4 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) during 2012,
contributing $887.3 billion to the economy.”).
99. James, supra note 79, at 100.
100. Dana Brakman Reiser, Filling the Gaps in Nonprofit Accountability: Applying the
Club Perspective in the U.S. Legal System, in NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY CLUBS:
VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NONPROFIT AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (2008).
101. Id.
102. Lee & Nowell, supra note 78, at 300.
103. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 82, at 361.
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in 2007,104 jurisdictions enacted legislation on new legal forms to enable
founders of social enterprises to explicitly claim social mission and profitmaking in a single entity.105 To date these new legal entities include the
low-profit limited liability company (or “L3C”),106 the benefit LLC,107 the
benefit corporation (or “b-corp”),108 and the social purpose corporation.109
These hybrid-entity statutes are the first new corporate forms with a
national scope to be introduced into American corporate law since the
limited liability partnership in 1991.110 Generally, these hybrid entities
104. For example, L3C became an official entity in Vermont on April 30, 2008. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (2008). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (enabling an
articles of incorporation “provision authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct the
business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.”);
Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1019 (2009).
105. See Reiser, supra note 3, at 685 (“One of the most basic things social entrepreneurs
seek in a specialized legal form is safe space to declare that their entities are committed to a
new and different goal — pursuing both profit and social good.”).
106. The L3C retain the flexibility and protections of the standard LLC while
integrating the Internal Revenue Code definitions of “charitable” and “educational” purpose.
Dana Thompson, L3Cs an Innovative Choice for Urban Entrepreneurs and Urban
Revitalization, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 146 (2012). If the L3C ceases to comply with the
Internal Revenue Code definitions, it automatically converts into a traditional LLC. Id. at
150; see also Reiser, supra note 3, at 690 (“The L3C adds charitable or education purpose
requirements to an otherwise standard LLC framework.”).
107. The benefit LLC relies on the traditional LLC framework but requires the entity to
pursue a general public benefit that is evaluated by a third-party standard. MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-1101 to -1108 (LexisNexis 2013), amended by 2013 Md.
Laws. ch. 527 (S.B. 697) (codifying benefit LLCs); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.750-66.770
(2014). Oregon is one of a few states that provides for the benefit LLCs; the greater number
of benefit LLCs over benefit corporations in Oregon suggests that the LLC format often
works better for small businesses. See Active Benefit Companies, STATE OF OREGON,
https://data.oregon.gov/Business/Active-Benefit-Companies/baig-8b9x
[https://perma.cc/KW9L-MSDG] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (listing the active benefit
corporations in the State of Oregon).
108. By statute the b-corp must pursue an articulated general public benefit, defined as
“a material positive impact on society and the environment, . . . assessed against a thirdparty standard . . . .” MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 102 (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016). A b-corp is
not synonymous with a company that has received certification from the organization B
Lab, although both are called “benefit corporations.” To be certified by B Lab as a benefit
corporation an entity does not have to be incorporated or be a b-corp under state statute.
109. See Alexandra Leavy, Necessity Is the Mother of Invention: A Renewed Call to
Engage the SEC on Social Disclosure, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 463, 482-83 (2014)
(describing the requirements of the Social Purpose Corporation).
110. See Alysa Christmas Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the
Family Business: The Lawyer As Intermediary, 73 IND. L.J. 567, 587 n.2 (1998) (noting that
Texas was the first state to enact a statute allowing limited liability partnerships in 1991);
Cf. Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the
Corporate Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 201 (2015) [hereinafter Corporate
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have been met with excitement111 and embraced by various segments
within both the business and legal communities.112 But scholars have also
documented the potential dangers and unintended consequences of
segregating social enterprises into separate legal entities, namely
succumbing to the theory that traditional for-profit entities require directors
to prioritize profit maximization in their corporate decision-making.113
Objectives] (“[A] more recent corporate entity development is the rise of the ‘social
enterprise.’”).
111. Kyle Westaway, Something Republicans and Democrats Can Agree On: Social
Entrepreneurship,
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Apr.
17,
2012),
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/something_republicans_and_democrats_can_agree_on_social_e
ntrepreneurship [https://perma.cc/X4EE-AF4Y].
112. Mike Isaac & David Gelles, Kickstarter Focuses Its Mission on Altruism Over
Profit,
N.Y.
(Sept.
20,
2015),
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/technology/kickstarters-altruistic-vision-profits-as-themeans-not-the-mission.html [https://perma.cc/GM3J-JHYE]; Heerad Sabeti, The ForBenefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/11/the-for-benefitenterprise [https://perma.cc/833C-DUL6]. Embracement by these communities will help
these hybrid entities succeed. Cf. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS 64-69 (2004)
(cautioning that interest-convergence, the apparent reconciliation of competing values,
among the disenfranchised and empowered populations that lead to possibly effective
remedies will not ultimately achieve promised structural change because these results will
be abrogated at the point they threaten the empowered); Derrick Bell, Brown vs. Board of
Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1980)
(describing how the divergence of interests makes integration less feasible).
113. Blount & Nunley, supra note 24, at 312 (“The danger of creating new entity forms
is that in the long term, limiting social enterprise to certain entity forms may result in
marginalizing the value creation concepts of social enterprise to a subset of business entities,
which has the potential to limit social enterprise’s impact on society. The creation of new
hybrid entities also tacitly gives credence to the widely held but inaccurate view that
standard, for-profit corporations can legally justify misconduct or unethical decision-making
as the relentless pursuit of profits required by corporate law.”); Joseph W. Yockey, Does
Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 800 (2015) (“[S]ome maintain that
benefit corporations statutes actually create a harmful dichotomy between ‘profit-only’
corporations and ‘responsible’ corporations. The argument is that, by resting on the false
premise that managers of traditional corporations must prioritize profits above all else, the
benefit corporation form undermines efforts to convince all corporate managers that CSRdriven activities are consistent with their fiduciary duties.” (emphasis in original)); see also
Joan Heminway, Random Thoughts on the Beneficiaries of Corporate Board Decision
Making,
BUSINESS
LAW
PROF
BLOG
(June
10,
2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/06/random-thoughts-on-thebeneficiaries-of-corporate-board-decision-making.html#more [https://perma.cc/J575-2J3U]
(noting that for “states, like Tennessee, [that] have not expressly adopted in legislative or
judicial rule-making a shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . the enactment of benefit
corporation legislation may (unwittingly) be construed as an endorsement of the notion that
directors of [traditional] for-profit corporations . . . are required to consider only or
primarily . . . the pecuniary interests . . . of shareholders.”); Mark A. Underberg, Benefit
Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
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Although currently most social enterprises are not formed as a hybrid
entity,114 the hybrid entities still serve an important and growing segment of
the social enterprise sector. Hybrid entities are visible representatives for
the recent rise in social enterprises even if they are a relatively small
percentage of social enterprises. Hybrid entities also help create the
counter-norm for what it means to be a social enterprise in the public
perception because they are off-the-shelf legal forms that contemplate
profit returns and social mission. Hybrid entities allow the emerging sector
to better define which businesses fit the definition of a social enterprise.
The legal structures of hybrid entities would not be advantageous for
traditional charity-focused nonprofits that do not have a substantial revenue
stream because hybrid entities do not provide a favorable tax treatment.115
Similarly, it is not clear that a traditional for-profit business would benefit
from forming as a hybrid entity. Thus, it is a fair assertion that, for all
practical purposes, the vast majority of hybrid entities are social
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(May
13,
2012),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-aharmful-dichotomy/ [https://perma.cc/FXG9-M8FB] (“[V]iewed from a broader corporate
governance perspective, the [benefit corporation] initiative — however well-intentioned —
has troubling implications. The problem is that its primary rationale rests on the mistaken,
though widely-held, premise that existing law prevents boards of directors from considering
the impact of corporate decisions on other stakeholders, the environment or society at large.
This crabbed view of directorial fiduciary duties perpetuates the unfortunate misconception
that existing law compels companies to single-mindedly maximize profits and share price,
and in so doing undermines the very values that corporate governance advocates should
seek to promote: responsible, sustainable corporate decision-making by companies of any
stripe.”). But see MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 101(b) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016) (“Application
of business corporation law generally. — The existence of a provision of this [chapter] shall
not of itself create an implication that a contrary or different rule of law is applicable to a
business corporation that is not a benefit corporation. This [chapter] shall not affect a statute
or rule of law that is applicable to a business corporation that is not a benefit corporation.”
(emphasis omitted)).
114. Exact numbers and percentages are hard to pin down because of the limited
empirical data on the social enterprise sector. See Anner, supra note 73 (noting the
“decided lack” of empirical data on social enterprises). “There are 1008 companies that are
certified B corporations.” People Using Business as a Force for Good, B LAB,
https://www.bcorporation.net/b-the-change [https://perma.cc/9TZF-6DV5] (last visited May
9, 2016). There is also the Social Enterprise Database with approximately 1,800 social
enterprises listed. Social Enterprise Database, GIVE TO GET JOBS: FOR-PROFIT JOBS THAT
GIVE
BACK,
http://givetogetjobs.com/socialenterprise.php?keywords=&zip=&zip_radius=&x=69&y=22]
[https://perma.cc/RLM5PNLX] (last visited May 9, 2016).
115. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 387, 421 (2014) (“[T]he creation of these new hybrids does not create any new tax
categories or treatments. The different types of hybrid corporations . . . are treated the same
as more typical state law corporations.”).
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enterprises, even though the community of social enterprises reaches
beyond hybrid-entity forms.
The argument for enacting hybrid-entity legislation is that traditional
for-profit and nonprofit legal entities frustrate the potential of a social
enterprise, forcing “a founder to choose between two equally inadequate
categories.”116 Regardless of their legal necessity,117 one cannot deny the
important normative discourse that hybrid-entity legislation has sparked
about the role for-profit companies ought to play within society.118
1. Fiduciary Duties Restrict Social Mission Considerations
The principal argument for hybrid-entity legislation is that fiduciary
duties of traditional for-profit entities, particularly a for-profit
corporation,119 force the directors and officers to prioritize owner
maximization of profit, with no carve out to preserve the social mission of
116. Reiser, supra note 3, at 683. See also WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 1 (“The
sustainable business movement, impact investing and social enterprise sectors are
developing rapidly but are constrained by an outdated legal framework that is not equipped
to accommodate for-profit entities whose social benefit purpose is central to their
existence.”).
117. See, Blount & Nunley supra note 110, at 223 (arguing that hybrid entities are “an
overly complex solution to the relatively basic core difference between a social enterprise
and a traditional for-profit business — a different corporate objective. By focusing on this
basic distinction, a much simpler, but more effective, approach to reform can be devised that
addresses the heart of the problem.” (footnote omitted)).
118. See TEDx, TEDxPhilly – Jay Coen Gilbert – On Better Businesses, YOUTUBE
(Dec.
1,
2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU
[https://perma.cc/E2CM-UNGN], at 10:10 (“Right now our capitalist system is not serving
society; it’s serving shareholders. And we can’t run around expecting different outcomes
until we change the rules of the game.”).
119. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end . . . and does not extend to . . . other
purposes.”); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 1994) (“a
corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”). See also THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, MIXING
MISSION AND BUSINESS: DOES SOCIAL ENTERPRISE NEED A NEW LEGAL APPROACH? 14
(2007),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/New_Legal_Forms_Rep
ort_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XMZ-2SF8] (“[T]raditional corporations have a duty to
maximize financial returns for shareholders, broadening that mandate to include a duty to a
social mission could require revisions in state corporate law.”). But see Stop Teaching
Dodge, supra note 18, at 165-68 (explaining that the Michigan Supreme Court’s “offhand
remark” regarding the powers of directors is “judicial dicta, quite unnecessary to reach the
Court’s desired result” because the case deals “with controlling shareholders’ duties not to
oppress minority shareholders” not directors’ fiduciary duties as it is often relied on).
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the entity.120
Thus, it is often espoused that the fiduciary duty to maximize profits
prevents or, at least, limits the ability of directors and officers to consider
social goals at the risk of reducing profits.121 But as other scholars have
noted, corporate law does not require that shareholder maximization be the
sole objective of a for-profit entity.122 Courts routinely protect the
decisions of directors under the judicial doctrine called the “business
judgment rule”123 as long as any rational business purpose could have
120. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.,
Sept.
13,
1970,
at
33,
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html
[https://perma.cc/TV3J-VNJX] (“In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate
executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires,
which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic
rules of the society.”).
121. See Blount & Nunley, supra note 24, at 304-06 (recognizing and rejecting the
shareholder primacy argument for which many commentators argue).
122. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate
Governance Beyond the Shareholder Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 74 (2010)
(“Indeed, neither case law nor corporate statutes impose on directors and officers an
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. Even in Delaware, whose corporate code is less
receptive to stakeholder interests than many other state corporate statutes, there is no
requirement that management decision-making maximize shareholder wealth or even be
justified solely in terms of shareholder interests.”); John A. Pearce II, The Rights of
Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 251, 251 (2015)
(“Despite any misimpressions to the contrary, corporate statutes do not dictate that directors
have a singular duty to pursue profit-maximizing activities.”); Stop Teaching Dodge, supra
note 18, at 172 (“[T]he notion that corporate law as a positive matter ‘requires’ companies
to maximize shareholder wealth turns out to be spurious.”); Yockey, supra note 113, at 770
(“Proponents miss the mark when they argue that benefit corporation laws are necessary to
enable firms to put social goals on par with profits. Indeed, corporate law already provides
entrepreneurs with much of what the benefit corporation form claims to offer.”); see
generally, Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of
Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder
Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409 (2002) (discussing directors’ fiduciary duties in
various contexts as the law exists and is changing).
123. See Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 (11th Cir. 1989) (describing the
judicial deference given the board as the business judgment rule); Smith v. Van Gorkam,
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (explaining that the “business judgment rule exists to protect
and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors” and thus rest on the “fundamental principle . . . that the business and affairs of a
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors”); PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (outlining the duty of care required by directors
and officers to a corporation, subject to the business judgment rule); Douglas M. Branson,
The Rule That Isn’t A Rule - the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 632
(2002) (summarizing the development, role, and applicability of the business judgment rule
for modern directors).
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possible future benefit to the shareholders.124 As Professor Lynn Stout
argues, there is “judicial eagerness to protect directors” such that even
when they fail to offer long-run shareholder benefits, the court will often
make the connection for the directors.125 There are few legal scholars who
would not agree that, apart from limited defensive126 and change of control
decisions,127 “the business judgment rule will shelter corporate directors
from liability for virtually all operational decisions.”128
Although corporate law does not require directors and executives to
prioritize shareholder maximization in all decisions,129 the widely-held,
public perception is that profit objectives dominate traditional for-profit
companies.130
Those profit maximizing objectives, the perception
124. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp, 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (“[T]he business
judgment rule shields directors from personal liability if, upon review, the court concludes
the directors’ decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”); see also Lin,
supra note 44 at 369 (“Courts historically have shown great procedural and substantive
deference to the decisions and judgments of corporate executives.”).
125. Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18 at 171.
126. Directors are provided significantly less deference when the courts review
decisions undertaken defending takeover attempts. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors have the benefit of the
business judgment rule only if the directors can first demonstrate a legitimate threat to a
corporate policy and that their response was reasonable given the threat posed); eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Directors of a forprofit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a [corporate mission] to defend a business
strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization – at least not consistently
with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.”).
127. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (finding that when the company is broken up and shareholders are forced to sell their
shares, the board has a duty to maximize shareholder wealth by getting the highest possible
price for the shares). But see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (2002) (providing examples of the
Delaware Supreme Court systematically cutting back the situation where Revlon applies).
128. Reiser, supra note 3, at 687.
129. See Page & Katz, supra note 41, at 231-32 (discussing how profit maximization
may be the norm, but that norm is likely unenforceable in courts that regularly grant boards
of directors deference under the business judgment rule).
130. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 26, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/06/26/theshareholder-value-myth/ [https://perma.cc/E5MV-UADS] (“Shareholder-value thinking
dominates the business world today. Professors, policymakers, and business leaders
routinely chant the mantras that public companies ‘belong’ to their shareholders; that the
proper goal of corporate governance is to maximize shareholder wealth; and that
shareholder wealth is best measured by share price (meaning share price today, not share
price next year or next decade)”). See also Corporate Objectives, supra note 110, at 233–34
(“Because of the contractual uniformity around the default corporate objective of
shareholder wealth maximization, the public perception of the rigidity of the for-profit
corporate does not match the reality of flexibility allowed by law. This perception had led
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contends, will inevitably compromise any social goals in the company’s
decision-making. For this reason, legal theorists Edward Rock and
Michael Wachter characterize profit maximization as a “non-legally
enforceable rule or standard” or norm.131 They acknowledge that
competitive theory is a strong motivator to maintain the standard of
executives maximizing corporate profits.132 But they argue that the
standard is not legally enforceable.133 Courts are extremely reluctant to
intervene in claims “that managers are not maximizing firm value” and,
thus, reliably reject these shareholder claims.134 Although not legally
enforceable, the norm of profit maximization is still a dominant force in
for-profit company decision-making — so much so that legally enforceable
rules are unnecessary to perpetuate this practice across industry.
Hybrid entities, thus, are a powerful step towards disrupting the profit
maximization norm within for-profit companies.135 The hybrid-entity
forms allow founders, directors, and officers to preempt the common
conception that profit objectives will eventually govern business decisionmaking by explicitly designating the dual social mission commitment of
the company.136 The hybrid-entity form also establishes a clear expectation
for owners137 about the direction of the company that should mitigate owner
to an inaccurate but honestly felt need from social entrepreneurs for new business entities.”);
Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at 164 (noting that the general public pays little
attention to the scholarly debate regarding the legal purpose of the corporation).
131. Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1643 (“The most striking example of a
transfirm [non-legally enforceable rule or standard] of the corporation seems to be
‘maximize profits.’”).
132. Id. at 1644.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Press Release, Ello, PBC, A Better Way (Oct. 20, 2014),
https://ello.co/wtf/downloads/ello-pbc.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B2P-WFHJ] (“Ello exists for
your benefit, not just to make money.”); Jonathan Shieber, Ello Raises $5.5 Million, Legally
Files as Public Benefit Corp. Meaning No Ads Ever, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/23/ello-raises-5-5-million-legally-files-as-public-benefitcorp-meaning-no-ads-ever/ [https://perma.cc/Q68J-4YUN] (discussing Ello’s ability to raise
significant venture capital funds despite rejecting traditional revenue streams based on ads
and selling user data).
136. Reiser, supra note 3, at 684 (“Rather than hiding these dual aspirations [of profitmaking and social mission] behind a veneer of ‘business as usual’ or under the halo of
selflessness, these founders want to claim their social enterprise’s blended missions
explicitly.”).
137. See Celia R. Taylor, Berle and Social Businesses: A Consideration, 34 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2011) (explaining that charter documents are contracts “that provide
the discipline and incentives that corporations expect from fiduciaries”); see also PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 n.6 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1994) (“[T]here is little doubt that [social mission decisions] would normally be
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concerns down the line. Traditional for-profit legal entities may provide
the executives and directors with the legal right to consider nonshareholder stakeholders and social mission, but the hybrid entities
typically mandate a requirement for executives and directors to consider
the mission.138 Thus, the argument goes, hybrid entities remove speculation
and position the social mission in a prominent place within the company
decision-making.
2. Nonprofit Structure Restricts Revenue Generation
On the other hand, the argument is that the nonprofit legal form139 is
also insufficient for social enterprises because it does not provide the same
potential for growth and retaining talent as for-profit legal entities. While
all directors and officers must maintain the social mission of the
nonprofit,140 the inability141 to raise capital through equity investment142
frustrates the company’s ability to scale and attract competitive talent.
Retaining talent over the life of the nonprofit is also a serious barrier
because a nonprofit business cannot provide equity incentives to its
employees unlike lean, for-profit start-ups. The limit on commercial
activity directly related to the tax-exempt purpose of most nonprofits
imposes yet another obstacle to growth. The tax-exempt status of the
permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders. Such an agreement might be embodied in
the certificate of incorporation, or not.”).
138. See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016)
(“[D]irectors . . . shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon . . . the ability of
the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit purpose and any specific
public benefit purpose.”).
139. Although nonprofits can be formed as corporations, charitable trusts, or LLCs, this
Article recognizes that most nonprofit entities are formed as corporations and, thus, will use
nonprofit and nonprofit corporation interchangeably.
140. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, supra note 80, at 641 (noting that nonprofit directors
should be “principally concerned with the effective performance of their nonprofit’s
mission”).
141. See Clara Miller, The Equity Capital Gap, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 41, 42
(Summer
2008),
http://www.socialimpactexchange.org/sites/www.socialimpactexchange.org/files/publicatio
ns/equity_capital_gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/E897-WBCG] (highlighting the difference
between for-profit corporations’ ability to solicit equity capital, and nonprofits restrictions in
doing so because individuals are prohibited from owning and distributing profits in a
nonprofit corporation).
142. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980) (“A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as
members, officers, directors, or trustees.”).
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nonprofit social enterprise means that executives cannot use all possible
business strategies to support the business that would otherwise be
available if the entity was for-profit.143 The effect of limited commercial
activity means that many nonprofits depend on charitable donations from
the public and grants from the philanthropic sector. This is particularly
problematic for social change organizations or companies that pursue
counter-cultural objectives, as many social enterprises seek to do.144
Generally, the philanthropic sector financially supports those organizations
that are not engaged in radically altering established power structures.145
This means that social change organizations have a particularly hard time
finding funding and financial stability. “The hope is that the hybrid nature
of a social enterprise will allow firms to bypass the structural and financing
obstacles that confront . . . nonprofits so they can address social issues in
innovative ways.”146
3. The Current Impact of Hybrid Entities
While approximately three-quarters of state jurisdictions now provide
for some hybrid-entity form,147 a limited number of social enterprises have
143. See Reiser, supra note 3, at 682, 685-89 (describing the assertion that “social
enterprises can do more good for more people than traditional nonprofits because their
financing and business methods make them more efficient, effective, and scalable.”).
144. See William A. Bottiglieri et al., The Regulation of Non-Profit Organizations, 9 J.
BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH, no. 9, 2011, at 51 (noting that nonprofit organizations often
receive funding based on projects, which “can become problematic if the organization is not
currently working on a specific project which has caught the attention of the public”).
145. See Rickke Mananzala and Dean Spade, The Nonprofit Industrial Complex and
Trans Resistance, 5 SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOC. POL’Y 53, 57-58 (2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1201022 [https://perma.cc/G27F-T4ZY]
(“The process of successfully applying for funding, including having 501(c)(3) status or a
fiscal sponsor, researching applicable grants, writing formal funding requests using specific
jargon, having an awareness of current trends in funding, and having personal relationships
with philanthropic professionals requires skills and relationships that are concentrated in
people with educational, class, and race privilege.”). But see Alex Daniels, Ford Shifts
Grant Making to Focus on Inequality, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (June 11, 2015)
https://philanthropy.com/article/Ford-Shifts-Grant-Making-to/230839
[https://perma.cc/64LF-NWAN] (explaining why the Ford Foundation, a leader in
philanthropy, has changed its grant making focus to support broad social-change movements
and providing more operating expenses, president Darren Walker said a consistent theme
was that people “especially nonprofit leaders, feel that foundations aren’t investing in
building their institutions, building their capacity, and making them more durable and
fortified”).
146. Yockey, supra note 113, at 773.
147. See Brewer, Minnigh & Wexler, Social Enterprise by Non-Profits and Hybrid
Organizations, Portfolio #489, Social Enterprise Hybrids Across the U.S., BLOOMBERG BNA
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adopted these new legal entities.148 Different hybrid entities have different
potential reasons why founders and managers may not be selecting them.
For the L3C, the reasons posited include the lack of clarity regarding its
taxation status and ability to attract program-related investments from
private foundations.149 For the benefit corporation statutes, one reason is
the lack of precedent for how courts will enforce the fiduciary duties under
this corporate form.150 By creating new legally enforceable fiduciary duties
to additional stakeholders, hybrid entities require managers and directors to
serve “two masters,” also described as “dual mission-management.”151
Thus, hybrid entities potentially generate more ambiguities and uncertainty
than solutions. There is also the issue that corporate lawyers, who social
entrepreneurs consult with for entity formation counsel, are not generally
comfortable advising their clients to experiment with these new entity
forms.152
(2014), http://socentlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Social-Enterprise-Hybrids-MapMar-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M9Q-3NAG] (providing a map showing various hybridentity forms as they do or do not exist in the United States).
148. See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 115, at 389 (estimating that over “1000 of these
new entities now exist”).
149. See Thompson, supra note 106, at 145-50 (discussing the reluctance of foundations
to make program-related investments (PRIs) to L3Cs because it may be unclear whether it
constitutes a proper PRI or improper “jeopardizing investment” for tax purposes, and the
“low-profit” designation of L3Cs deters other types of investment). Program-related
investments are tax-exempt investments, often low-interest loans or investments with an
anticipated low return on investments, which private foundations make in nonprofit and
social enterprise programs that further the tax-exempt mission of the private foundation.
For additional information regarding program-related investments, see Program Related
Investments,
I.R.S.,
https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/PrivateFoundations/Program-Related-Investments [https://perma.cc/QT6F-KNYX] (last visited
May 11, 2016).
150. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1027-34 (2013) (highlighting the numerous conflicts that
arise when benefit corporation directors must make a decision, requiring directors to weigh
many factors and consider multiple constituents, which leads to inferior decision-making
practices); Murray, supra note 2, at 27 (criticizing the lack of guidance for directors in
carrying out their fiduciary duties).
151. See Applying Traditional Corporate Law, supra note 15, at 223 (describing the
“two masters” issue for social enterprises as enterprises having a profit motive, but with
social or environmental missions still at their core); Laura A. Constanzo et al., Dual-Mission
Management in Social Entrepreneurship: Qualitative Evidence from Social Firms in the
United Kingdom, 52 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 655, 659–60 (2014) (discussing the divisive
nature of some business corporation structures due to competing interests).
152. See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25,
43 (2015) [hereinafter An Early Report on Benefit Reports] (noting the relative novelty of
the benefit corporate form to some attorneys, and the misinformation among companies and
legal sources when discussing benefit corporations); Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at
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Another barrier to social enterprises incorporating as hybrid
corporations is the perceived hardship in the benefit reporting
requirement.153 Hybrid-corporation statutes have, for the first time,
included regular reporting requirements that are regulatory in nature,
requiring social enterprises to measure impact and provide transparency
about the company’s social mission.154 Traditional corporate statutes do
not require similar public transparency. Corporate lawyers and companies
may be hesitant about the potential expense and effort of regularly
producing these benefit reports. But as explored above, selecting a
traditional for-profit or nonprofit entity can lead to deficiencies in corporate
governance and, thus, jeopardizes the sustainability of the social enterprise.
In fact, the legal entity selected for the social enterprise may not matter as
long as the company has the appropriate corporate governance structure in
place. That said, the benefit reporting required of hybrid corporations may
be an incredibly helpful tool in facilitating the social enterprise sector to
develop and share corporate governance platforms that balance profit and
mission.
Corporate lawyers working with social enterprises need an effective
vocabulary to articulate the value of the benefit reporting requirements
contained in the hybrid-corporation statutes. This Article continues the
conversation on the contributions of hybrid-corporation statutes by
explaining the impact that benefit reporting requirements could have on
increased social enterprise governance, if adopted by social enterprises
regardless of their legal form. Improved corporate governance across all
social enterprise legal forms is necessary for a more effective and
sustainable social enterprise sector.
II.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGMS

The established corporate governance paradigm provides standards for
transparency and accountability, but the regulatory governance regime is
largely based on regulating and monitoring public companies. However,
all companies, even small social enterprises, need robust corporate
governance enforcement mechanisms because business entities, regardless
of size, contain a variety of divergent interests that need to be aligned.
Corporate law plays a major role not only in helping companies align these
174 (noting that it takes “a certain degree of boldness to depart from [corporate law]
tradition.”).
153. See infra Part II.C for more details on the requirement of various benefit reports.
154. See Yockey, supra note 113, at 799 (discussing the unique public/private
characteristics of benefit corporation enabling laws).
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divergent interests by requiring a system of checks and balances among the
board of directors, executives, and owners, but also by establishing legal
liability for the breach of fiduciary duties amongst these parties. In
addition to the statutory framework of corporate governance, companies
and industries have developed norms that function as a de facto corporate
governance regime to promote best practices and a state of mind around
balancing interests.
Currently, the limited corporate governance
enforcement and norm development in the social enterprise sector means
there are not adequate governance mechanisms for these unique entities.
Social enterprises are, thus, particularly vulnerable to risk and mishaps that
could otherwise be avoided with sustained corporate governance practices.
A. Statutory Framework of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance refers to the rules and structures for effective
business oversight that bring a balance of power between the divergent
interests of the managers, directors, and owners in furtherance of the
company’s goals. Effective corporate governance is achieved by the
adherence to standards of behavior and performance demands.155 There is a
well-developed, for-profit legal framework defining the rights and
responsibilities of three social systems: directors, managers, and
shareholders.
When implemented effectively, corporate governance
provides several systems to ensure that the company is run efficiently and
achieving its primary purpose, whether that be maximizing shareholder
value for a for-profit company or advancing the specified tax-exempt
purpose of a nonprofit corporation. Effective corporate governance results
in well-managed companies that have the capacity to outperform their
competitors and exist for a long time.156
This section explores the various factors that make up the components
of the United States corporate governance regime. Both federal and state
laws play a foundational role in helping companies align the divergent
interests among the executives, the board of directors, and the owners.
Regulatory agencies also influence and impose corporate governance
standards. Lastly, market demands and the globalization of business also
have an increasingly profound influence on corporate governance best
155. See Chris Mason et. al., From Stakeholders to Institutions: The Changing Face of
Social Enterprise Governance Theory, 45 MGMT. DECISION 284, 293 (2007) (discussing the
creation of explicit or implicit standards that reflect the needs of the primary beneficiary of
the corporation).
156. Varun Bhat, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions for
the Future, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1435–36 (2007).
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practices.
The primary purpose of corporate governance in a for-profit entity is
to align the defining characteristic of corporate design, separation of
ownership157 and control.158 The legal innovation of the for-profit
corporation allowed for the growth of the modern economy by stratifying
constituencies that have pluralist interests within the entity.159 The interests
of shareholders and managers, who act on behalf of the shareholders to
operate the business, do not always coincide.160 Management may engage
in reckless or fraudulent business practices to maximize short-term benefits
that increase the value of their annual bonuses, create stock price
distortions, or improve their working conditions at the expense of the
shareholders’ ownership value.161 In theory, the board curtails the actions
of the managers to the benefit of the shareholders by providing supervision,
reviewing business decisions, and establishing corporate policies. But the
directors who serve on the board are often key executive managers and
independent directors who are selected by the very managers they are
supposed to oversee. Thus, the objective of good corporate governance to
harmonize those pluralist interests for the common goal of the legal entity
is not likely achieved by mere structure alone.
There are three commonly recognized categories of corporate law:
157. Investors contribute capital in exchange for ownership of the corporation and avoid
liability past the amount of their investment for the acts of the corporation.
158. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATIONS AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-90 (Transaction Publishers ed. 1991) (classifying the varying degrees
of separation between ownership and control among the two hundred largest American
corporations).
159. DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 4 (2010) (“Historians have pointed to one event that occurred during the
Renaissance as among the most significant in modern history: the creation of the limitedliability joint-stock corporation. This legal innovation made it possible and attractive for
investors to pool capital to build companies that could grow virtually without limit.”).
160. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (2002) (highlighting
the fact that directors may inadvertently deviate from optimal executive compensation plans
due to several external factors, which leads to rent in the form of excessive executive
compensation that is contrary to shareholder interests).
161. See JAY SAMIT, DISRUPT YOU!: MASTER PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION, SEIZE
OPPORTUNITY, AND THRIVE IN THE ERA OF ENDLESS INNOVATION 96 (2015) (“CEOs will
gladly overpay for [a] company if the acquisition enables them to keep their jobs. This is
why so many acquisitions end up adding no value to the acquirer. The CEO is not risking
his or her career with the purchase of a company; on the contrary, the CEO is buying
another chance to keep his or her job.”); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 198 (2012) (“[D]otcom era frauds typically
involved cooking the books so as to raise — or at least support — the firm’s stock price so
that the managers could profit from their stock options.”).

956

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18:4

“(1) ‘internal’ corporate law (that is, the requirements set out in an
individual corporation’s charters and bylaws); (2) state corporate codes;
and (3) corporate case law.”162 The state statutory and case law where the
company is incorporated establishes the basic framework for the
responsibilities and the role of the board as well as imposes the division of
responsibilities and fiduciary duties on officers, directors, and
shareholders163 to better distribute power within a corporation. Arguably at
the center of the pluralist interests of the company is the board of
directors,164 which collectively is the governing body upon which the state
statutory codes impose the most requirements.165 The role of the board is to
formulate corporate policies and oversee the managers and officers who
implement those policies through the day-to-day operations of the
company.166 The role of the board is to appoint, oversee, and compensate
senior management; review budgets and strategies; and scrutinize the
financial reporting and capital structure of the company. Thus, one of the
board’s priorities is the ongoing assessment of its effectiveness in
performing this oversight function.167
This statutory emphasis on the board is what Professor Bainbridge
refers to as a “board-centered system of corporate governance,”168 which is
in contrast to previous orientations in corporate law that were shareholder-

162. Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at 168.
163. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2015) (requiring the corporation to hold
annual shareholders meetings to elect the directors); Id. § 211(d) (2009) (allowing
shareholders to call special meetings if the corporation’s organizational documents allow
them to do so).
164. STEVEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 32-35 (2008) (hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE)
(arguing that the contractarian theory of the corporation posits that the board of directors is
the corporate nexus); PHILIP STILES & BERNARD TAYLOR, BOARDS AT WORK: HOW
DIRECTORS VIEW THEIR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2001) (highlighting that “the board
[of directors] is the link between the shareholders of the firm and the managers entrusted
with undertaking the day-to-day operations of the organization”).
165. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 141(a) (2015) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of the
board of directors”).
166. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002).
167. STEVEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 164, at 1112, 15 (arguing that “there must be mechanisms to ensure director accountability” and that
“the board has virtually unconstrained freedom to exercise business judgment.”).
168. Id. at 4 (stating that “[u]nder all corporation statutes, the key players in the formal
decision-making structure are the members of the board of directors who are empowered to
make or delegate to employees most decisions affecting the business and affairs of the
corporation.”).
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centric169 or managerial-centric.170 Historically, statutory corporate law has
a “strong emphasis on collective decision-making by the board,”171 in large
part to counter-balance the pathologies of corporate managers who, if left
un-checked, could engage in self-serving decision-making. For example,
in California the corporate code requires at least two directors if the
corporation has more than one shareholder.172 State corporate law, as
modified by the corporation’s charter documents, provides that the board
can exercise all of the corporation’s powers.173 However, certain decisions
and transactions require shareholder approval, such as mergers and
amendments to the charter documents.174
Directors owe the corporation and its shareholders fiduciary duties.
Principally, there are two duties: the duty of care, which requires a director
to make informed prudent decisions, and the duty of loyalty, which requires
the director to place the interest of the corporation above her own personal
interest in a transaction or decision. In determining whether a board of
directors has satisfied its fiduciary duties of care, the courts apply the
business judgment rule, which assumes the fiduciary duties of care have
been satisfied unless there is an interested director and a duty of loyalty
issue.175 Directors’ decisions may be more strictly scrutinized with respect
to certain transactions, including a change of control of the corporation.
But corporation codes and case law only provide the basic framework of
corporate governance.176 Despite these state-imposed duties and structure,
169. Shareholder primacy assumes that the shareholders should control the corporation,
in some ultimate fashion, as they are the appropriate beneficiaries of director fiduciary
duties and corporate governance. STEVEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 164, at 10.
170. See Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1611, 1612 (1981) (noting that the corporation “was run by managers who were accountable
only to themselves and could blink at obligations to shareholders and society.”).
171. Bainbridge, supra note 166, at 19.
172. CAL. CORP. CODE § 212(a) (2015).
173. Id. § 208 (2015).
174. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2015) (requiring shareholder approval of
a board’s proposed amendment to charter); Id. § 271(a) (2016) (requiring a majority
shareholder approval to sell or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets).
175. There is the likelihood that any number of board decisions could have the potential
to increase the long-term benefit to the corporation. Thus, courts allow a great scope in
determining if the decision could be in the long-term interests of the company. STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 242 (2002) (“[T]he duty of care tells
directors to exercise reasonable care in making corporate decisions . . . [but] the business
judgment rule says that courts must defer to the board of directors’ judgment absent highly
unusual exceptions.”).
176. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 164, at 20 (“The
statutory model of corporate governance is splendidly minimalist. Corporation codes
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there is still concern that boards are not meaningfully accountable within
the company.177
Most states allow a corporation to eliminate or limit directors’
personal liability to the corporation or its shareholders for breach of their
fiduciary duty of care.178 Corporations often adopt provisions in their
certificates of incorporation eliminating directors’ liability to the fullest
extent permitted by law, which in Delaware means that directors are not
liable unless they breach their duty of loyalty or act in bad faith.179 Despite
these statutory guidelines and case law, there is so much flexibility in
exercising the duty of care that the best interests of the company are not
adequately enforced by state corporate law alone.180 The contractual
relationships within the firm that the statute creates, while helpful for
establishing the basic structure of the corporation, are inadequate to govern
all the relationships of the company.181 Thus, a company also needs good
internal policies and structures to regulate its corporate governance.
B. New Governance and Transfirm Norm Creation
Statutory corporate laws are necessary to establish the basic
framework of distributing responsibilities within the company but are
insufficient to ensure sharing of information and balancing of competing
interests in good corporate governance. The substance of good corporate
governance is not mandated by the state but enacted and adopted by the
company in charter documents, policies, and procedures. Governance
scholars theorize that corporate law creates a framework that will facilitate
provide only very limited guidance as to proper roles for boards of directors.”).
177. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278, 290 (1999) (arguing that directors “are not subject to direct control
or supervision by anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.”).
178. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015) (allowing for “eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,” except as otherwise specified
in that section of the statute).
179. Id.
180. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, G20/OECD
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/CorporateGovernance-Principles-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD96-NGZT] (emphasizing the
importance of public enforcement and regulatory authorities in promoting and maintaining
good corporate governance).
181. Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1640. See also Litowitz, supra note 89, at 508
(“As a force of legitimation, corporate law lays down a thick rhetorical gloss to convey the
impression that corporate governance is a realm of procedure, fairness, consensus, and
business judgment.”).

2016]

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNMENT

959

the development of standards that will privately regulate the company.182
As Professors Rock and Wachter summarize, “the myriad transactions that
take place inside the [company] are largely (but not entirely) protected by
the fundamentally different governance mechanism, one that is almost
entirely not legally enforceable.”183 Decisions within the company, they
argue, are largely “governed by norms rather than law.”184 Norms differ
from law in that they are not legally enforceable. The task each company
must achieve is to establish those norms that enhance their accountability to
stakeholders and allow them to resolve problems within the company.
Another characteristic of norms is that they form what is often referred
to as company culture, because norms influence behaviors and social
interactions.185 Of course not all norms are conducive to the company’s
success.186 Desirable norms serve “a coordinating function, making it more
likely that employees will do what they are supposed to do when they are
supposed to do it.”187 Some norms “are top-down, with senior management
choosing and enforcing them. Others emerge bottom-up and might then be
adopted and enforced by the firm. Still others can become a kind of
counterculture, enforced not by the firm but by the employees
themselves.”188 The role of the board is to determine which desirable
norms support the success of the business. To be adopted within the
company as a norm, the norm needs to be consistent with the company’s
mission and broader values.
Furthermore, norms are not merely limited to a company but can reach
across an industry. These norms across firms are what Professors Rock and
Wachter refer to as “transfirm” norms.189 These desirable transfirm norms
are often what we refer to as best practices in an industry. For example, the
notion that directors have board term limits is an instance of a transfirm
norm. Board terms are instituted to mitigate groupthink and deference to
executive decisions. New perspectives on the board can prevent inertia and
can inspire new directions for the company. In other words, transfirm
182. Yockey, supra note 113, at 770, 802-06.
183. Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1640 (this is in contrast to “the transactions
between the firm and its suppliers, customers, and other parties who work outside of the
boundaries of the firm are largely (but by no means entirely) governed by legally
enforceable contracts.”).
184. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator of Self
Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 529, 534 (2000).
185. Rock & Wachter, supra note 87, at 1642.
186. Id. at 1643.
187. Id. at 1642.
188. Id. at 1642.
189. Id. at 1643-45.
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norms are an important element of how companies and industries are
resilient through change and help promote and reinforce desirable corporate
behavior. Thus, the legal system has strong incentives for supporting the
development of these transfirm norms in various industries. How the legal
system effectively influences non-legally enforceable norms is the
challenge scholars have devoted much time to researching.190
New governance theory191 not only provides a theoretical framework
to address how government can facilitate desirable transfirm norms but also
explains the potential impact of hybrid-corporation statutes on the
development of social enterprise governance. The umbrella term “new
governance” describes the unifying principles among several strains of
legal scholarship.192 One of the core principles of new governance theory is
a commitment to stakeholder problem-solving and the development of
norms facilitated through state intervention that is ultimately shaped and
informed by practitioner implementation and innovation.193 “[N]ew
governance . . . refers to a collection of ideas for governance where law
serves as a launching point for a multi-dimensional approach to addressing
complex social and economic challenges.”194 New governance maintains
that the state is an important component as a facilitator rather than a
regulator, while the implementation of policy is left to those individuals
with the subject matter expertise. For state-imposed laws to function under
the new governance model, the laws need to be flexible and adaptable to
allow for experimentation at the implementation stage. This flexibility,
which can also be characterized as ambiguity, requires the collaboration of
both legal and industry forces to achieve the desired outcomes.
New governance methods are particularly useful with complex
industries, markets, or problems because they enable “the development of
holistic, creative, cross-disciplinary, cross-jurisdictional, and cross-

190. Id. at 530-32.
The term “new governance theory” describes a paradigm shift from top-down,
command-and-control regulation to collaborative governance systems. New governance
theory rests on the premise that the state alone cannot effectuate societal change and that it
therefore needs to engage with private actors to leverage their expertise in dynamic and
complex contexts. The traditional, hierarchical regulation approach, “which is generally
adversarial and punitive,” places the state in opposition to private actors, while new
governance models engender partnership, revision, and collaboration. David Hess, Social
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate
Accountability through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 453 (2007).
192. Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance
Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 405 (2013).
193. Id. at 406.
194. Yockey, supra note 113, at 799.
191
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institutional solutions.”195 Case studies have qualitatively demonstrated
improved outcomes when new governance methods are used to address
complex issues.196 Corporations are isomorphic in that they internalize
institutional norms and function within the same statutory regimes;197 and,
thus, can be conducive to developing transfirm norms through new
governance methods.
Applying this literature to social enterprises, a new governance
perspective to analyzing hybrid-corporation statutes recognizes that the
new “legal forms and structures can send important signals that help to
form a consensus around particular norms.”198 Because desirable transfirm
norms can coalesce into industry best practices, hybrid-corporation statutes
can also be interpreted as an attempt to create best practices within the
nascent social enterprise sector. This warrants further examining the
normative impact hybrid-corporation statutes may have on solving
governance issues within the social enterprise sector.199
C. Benefit Reporting as a New Governance Model
The benefit reporting requirements within hybrid-corporation statutes
have quasi-regulatory characteristics that make them unique among the
corpus of corporate law.200 These regular reporting requirements also
provide the authoritative foundation upon which social enterprises can
develop, document, share, and refine corporate governance models and
practices within this sector. In enacting hybrid-corporation statutes, the
state’s primary role has been to facilitate and promote collaboration among
social enterprise practitioners to, among other things, develop governance
norms. Not only could the benefit reporting requirements lead to new
governance practices for hybrid corporations, but these statutory
frameworks could also establish the de facto market forces that influence
and maintain good corporate governance in the social enterprise sector.

195. Lee, supra note 192, at 412.
196. Id. at 416.
197. Mason et al., supra note 155, at 293 (demonstrating that organizational action
converges “where regulatory and other external environmental conditions are supportive of
it.”).
198. Yockey, supra note 113, at 801.
199. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 520-22 (2001) (discussing the law’s normative impact
on context-based problem solving to eliminate employment discrimination within individual
companies).
200. Yockey, supra note 113, at 799.
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1. Benefit Reporting Overview
State legislatures, at the behest of B-Lab pioneers,201 have innovated
corporate statutory laws by creating hybrid corporations such as the benefit
corporation and the social purpose corporation. Additionally, they have
also, for the first time, included regular reporting requirements that are
regulatory in nature and resemble the federal securities reporting
requirements.202 The reporting requirements apply to the hybrid entity,
regardless of the company’s size or number of shareholders. These
“benefit reports” requirements vary from state to state in aspects such as
how often they need to be produced and distributed to the stakeholders, the
necessary components of the reports, and the standards used to measure the
company’s social impact. Despite these differences, the benefit reports
share more in common than not as the primary objectives of all benefit
reports is to measure impact and provide transparency about the company’s
social mission. The following outlines the key characteristics in the benefit
report statutory requirements.
a. Model B-corp: accountability focused reporting
requirements
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the “Model”) is the most
widely adopted hybrid-corporation statute.203 The benefit corporation
under the Model (the “Model B-corp”) is required to send an annual benefit
report to shareholders “[w]ithin 120 days following the end of the fiscal
year of the benefit corporation or at the same time the benefit corporation
delivers other annual reports to shareholders.”204 The Model B-corp benefit
report must be posted to a publically available portion of the company’s
website or provided free of charge upon request.205 This annual benefit
201. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 5.
202. Yockey, supra note 113, at 799.
203. Murray, supra note 24, at 346-48; State by State Status of Legislation, B LAB,
http://benefitcorp.org/policymakers/state-by-state-status
[https://perma.cc/Z4ZH-GVY8]
(explaining that to date, the Model has been adopted in at least 31 states including Arizona
(2014), Arkansas (2013), California (2012), Colorado (2014), Connecticut (2014), District
of Columbia (2012), Florida (2014), Hawaii (2011), Idaho (2015), Illinois (2013), Indiana
(2015), Louisiana (2012), Massachusetts (2012), Maryland (2010), Minnesota (2015),
Montana (2015), Nebraska (2014), Nevada (2014), New Hampshire (2015), New Jersey
(2015), New York (2012), Oregon (2014), Pennsylvania (2013), Rhode Island (2014), South
Carolina (2012), Tennessee (2016), Utah (2014), Vermont (2011), Virginia (2011), and
West Virginia (2014)) (last visited May 11, 2016).
204. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402(a)(1)-(2) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016).
205. Id. at § 402(b)-(c).
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report must also be filed with the Secretary of State, with a fee to offset the
additional administrative cost to collect and sort through the reports.206
The reporting categories are vague for the Model B-corp and, thus,
vary at the state level.207 Oregon, for example, requires the company’s
disclosure of: the actions and methods used to provide a general or specific
public benefit; any circumstances that hindered or prevented a benefit; and
how well the benefit company met or exceeded the third-party standard.208
The Model requires that the Model B-corp assess its overall social and
environmental performance on a yearly basis using an independent thirdparty standard.209 There must also be a compliance statement from the
benefit director.210 However, the assessment does not need to be audited or
certified by a third party.211 The reasoning for the third-party standard,
which is described as the lynchpin to the Model B-corp,212 is that it will
prevent the benefit corporation from using an assessment tool that is merely
self-serving. However, third-party standards vary significantly,213 resulting
in a lack of consistency among the current benefit reports. For instance,
there is also significant latitude in what the benefit corporation reports or
not under the various third-party standards.
The Model does not, however, expressly include an enforcement
mechanism specifically related to either the truthfulness or even the
existence of those reports.214 As a result, a number of benefit corporations
have not provided or even produced the required benefit reports, and there
206. Id. at § 402(d). For example, Rhode Island requires a $60 filing fee and
Massachusetts requires a $75 filing fee with the annual benefit report. R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN.
§ 7-5.3-13 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §16 (West 2016).
207. Murray, supra note 24, at 359.
208. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.768(2) (West 2016).
209. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a)(2) (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016).
210. Id. § 401(a)(5) (referencing MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(c) which describes
annual compliance statement requirements).
211. Id. § 401(c).
212. Reiser, supra note 3, at 690-91 (“These third-party standards lies at the heart of the
benefit corporation concept.”).
213. How Do I Pick a Third Party Standard?, BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/how-do-i-pick-third-party-standard
[https://perma.cc/4LZX-SFUH] (last visited May 19, 2016) (providing a non-exhaustive list
of third-party standards for benefit reporting); see also An Early Report on Benefit Reports,
supra note 152, at 49 (noting that “the quality of the [third-party] standard used is not
currently regulated.”).
214. Theoretically, shareholders can bring a claim under the benefit enforcement
proceeding process. But without monetary liability for failure to pursue or create a general
public benefit, it is not likely that shareholders would go through the expense or trouble of
brining such a case against the benefit corporation. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305 (B
LAB Jan. 13, 2016); Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 20, at 1075.
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has been little to no action taken to correct these statutory violations. The
Model has been criticized for this lack of an enforcement mechanism.215
b. Delaware PBC: board-centered reporting requirements
The majority of public corporations in the United States and over sixty
percent of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware.216 For this reason,
among others, Delaware is a recognized leader in corporate law. Not
surprisingly, Delaware established its own version of a benefit corporation
statute called the public benefit corporation (the “PBC”), which in several
ways resembles the Model B-corp. One of the material differences
between the PBC and the Model B-corp are the deviations in the benefit
reporting requirements.217 The PBC must include:
(1) The objectives the board of directors has established to
promote such public benefit or public benefits and interests; (2)
The standards the board of directors has adopted to measure the
corporation’s progress in promoting such public benefit or public
benefits and interests; (3) Objective factual information based on
those standards regarding the corporation’s success in meeting
the objectives for promoting such public benefits or public
benefits and interests; and (4) An assessment of the corporation’s
success in meeting the objectives and promoting such public
benefit or public benefits and interests.218

The PBC promotes a board-centered approach and provides for
flexibility at each critical component of the benefit report. PBCs, for
example, do not have to assess their impact using an independent thirdparty standard, unless specified in the corporation’s certificate of
incorporation.219 Thus, under the Delaware statute, the board is empowered
to use its own assessment tool, to determine if the report needs to be made
public,220 and determine if assessment needs to be conducted more than
once every other year.221 The benefit report needs to be produced no less

215. An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 44.
216. About Agency, STATE OF DELAWARE — DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/R6S7-UWW3] (last
visited May 11, 2016).
217. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 254 (2014).
218. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2015).
219. Id. § 366(b)(2) (2015).
220. Id. § 366(c)(2) (2015).
221. Id. § 366(c)(1) (2015).
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than biennially in Delaware.222
c. California SPC: governance focused reporting requirement
California is the most populous state to pass hybrid-entity legislation
and is a strong economic engine globally.223 The disruptive trends in
California influence what happens in other regions of business. It is also
considered the leading jurisdiction in the developing social enterprise
economy and is the domicile of one of the highest number of hybrid entities
formed to date.224 The state enacted a benefit corporation statute based on
the Model B-corp.225 However, in addition to the benefit corporation,
California is among the few states to also offer the social purpose
corporation (“SPC”),226 formerly named the flexible purpose corporation
(“FPC”).227
The SPC is a for-profit alternative to the traditional corporation and
the California benefit corporation. While the SPC integrates the majority
of the characteristics of the former FPC, in addition to the name change, the
amendments require the directors of SPCs to consider the social purposes
set forth in the articles of incorporation in their decision-making.228 All
SPCs regardless of size and number of shareholders must now prepare
social-purpose annual reports including management discussion and
analysis (“MD&A”) concerning the company’s operations and performance
222. Id. § 366(b)(2) (2015).
223. Samantha Masunaga, We’re No. 8: California near top of world’s largest
economies, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 2, 2015, 1:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-ficalifornia-world-economy-20150702-story.html
[https://perma.cc/CH8Y-NXV6]
(last
visited May 19, 2016).
224. Empirical data collected to date shows that Nevada has the most companies
incorporated as benefit corporations, followed by Oregon, Delaware, Colorado, New York
and California. See ELLEN BERREY, How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? 1 (May 5,
2015),
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
RESEARCH
NETWORK,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602781 [https://perma.cc/36TT-G99X]
(Click “Download This Paper”) (last visited May 11, 2016).
225. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600-14604 (2012).
226. See Id. §§ 2600–2604 (2015); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.005
(2012).
227. However, a flexible purpose corporation incorporated under the Corporate
Flexibility Act of 2011 is not required to change its status to a social purpose corporation
and any reference in the California Corporations Code to social purpose corporation is
deemed a reference to “flexible purpose corporation” as well. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§
2601(b)(2), (b)(3)(A) (2015).
228. Id. at § 3500(b) (2015). FPCs were not required to pursue a general society benefit
like the benefit corporation and FPC directors were not required to include social purposes
in their decision-making, but had the flexibility to do so.
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with respect to its special purposes. Similar to the Model B-corp’s annual
benefit report, the social-purpose annual report anticipates a discussion of
management strategy and skills. The social-purpose reports are also
required after certain events, such as significant capital expenditures that
may have a negative effective on the company’s social purpose.229 Thus,
the SPC social-purpose annual report is analogous to the aforementioned
benefit reporting requirements. However, there are no specifics about what
should be included in the social-purpose annual report, which enables SPCs
to neglect disclosing or discussing where they did not advance their social
purpose. The SPC statute does not require an independent third-party
standard to measure progress, which limits the accountability the socialpurpose annual report may provide.
2. Benefit Reporting as Value Creation
Each of these hybrid-corporation statutes can be understood from a
new governance perspective as the state encouraging social enterprise
practitioners to develop governance norms. “A new governance [take] on
self-regulation [would suggest] that the state should allow private actors in
specific industries or sectors to shape the standards and practices that
govern their affairs.”230 The benefit report requires discussion of overall
company performance, which necessarily requires an examination of
corporate governance practices, without dictating specific mandates about
what the governance practices should be.231 The Model states that the
annual benefit report is intended to permit an evaluation of . . .
performance so that the shareholders can judge how the directors
have discharged their responsibility to manage the corporation
and thus whether the directors should be retained in office or the
shareholders should take other action to change the way the
corporation is managed.232
Similar to the MD&A section of SEC registration statements and

229. Id. at § 3501 (2015). For FPCs with less than 100 shareholders that followed
certain procedures, the companies were also not required to measure and disseminate their
performance against a third-party standard in a benefit report, as benefit corporations are
required to do. See Id. § 3502(h) (2012).
230. Yockey, supra note 113, at 802-03.
231. See generally Jessica E. Sowa et. al, No Longer Unmeasurable? A
Multidimensional Integrated Model of Nonprofit Organizational Effectiveness, 33
NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 711 (2004) (discussing a method to evaluate
nonprofit effectiveness).
232. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 cmt. on Third Party Standard (B LAB Jan. 13,
2016).
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periodic reports filed under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, a social enterprise’s MD&A section of the benefit
report should discuss its business as a whole and include explanations of
the various segments of the business necessary to understanding the
company’s entire operations. A MD&A section of a benefit report would
be the appropriate place for the company to explain the governance model
of the social enterprise and how it facilitates the stated social mission,
including mechanisms for gathering and incorporating stakeholder
feedback in the strategy of the company. Because reporting on the
“objectives the board of directors has established to promote [the] public
benefit”233 will necessitate a consideration of the governance model, the
periodic and regular compositions of these benefit reports would allow the
social enterprise an opportunity to examine its corporate governance
structure and make strategic decisions about moving forward. In addition,
this annual or biennial review of the company better fulfills the board’s
obligations to provide management oversight, a commonly criticized
missing component in social mission organizations.
A criticism of the benefit reporting requirements is that they are
ambiguous. But the apparent lack of statutory direction for benefit
reporting is appropriate to provide social enterprise practitioners the
autonomy to determine the necessary elements of the report.234 One of the
core principles of new governance theory is a commitment to practitioners
developing the implementation through problem-solving and
experimentation. In furtherance of this, “new governance . . . intentionally
lacks formal procedural or substantive rights, and contains only nonbinding initiatives,”235 to provide practitioner flexibility and buy-in. To the
extent that clear best practices emerge from the social enterprise sector for
drafting the benefit reports, these are factors that could be included in the
various state statutes through amendments with the support of the social
enterprise community. However, “[a] detailed, rules-based approach to
reporting might also suffocate firms, stifle innovation, and decrease
intrinsic motivation,”236 which also explains why the current lack of detail
in the benefit report requirement is appropriate.
There is no indication that social enterprise practitioners or corporate
233. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b)(1) (2015).
234. Hess, supra note 190, at 455 (“New Governance operates not by setting strict
standards on regulated entities, but by setting the boundaries that allow experimentation to
occur at a more local level and then allowing the lessons from those experiences to update
standards and possibly be transferred to other areas.”).
235. Lisa T. Alexander, Reflections on Success and Failure in New Governance and the
Role of the Lawyer, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 737, 742 (2010).
236. An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 48-49.
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lawyers perceive the benefit reports as a governance tool. For social
enterprises incorporated as hybrid corporations, the early data on benefit
reporting reveals an “abysmal benefit report compliance rate (below ten
percent).”237 An important role that corporate lawyers should play is in
articulating how an examination of governance is an essential aspect of
company performance. Corporate lawyers are an indispensable component
of the federal corporate governance paradigm and compose significant
components of the disclosure reports for public companies.
The
professional responsibility rules of the legal profession add legitimacy to
the federal reporting process.238 Social enterprise practitioners’ do not
perceive benefit reports as necessary in part because there is no government
enforcement of this statutory requirement.239 But there is an opportunity
for social enterprises to substantially use this tool; and, thus, corporate
lawyers should explain the long-term value of regular reporting and not
merely the short-term expense to produce.
a. Benefit report perceived as marketing tool
Generally the benefit report is characterized as a marketing and
branding tool for social enterprises240 not a corporate governance
mechanism. Proponents of the Model B-corp have emphasized the benefit
report as useful for customers, likening the report to a branding tool for the
237. Id. at 26.
238. Every state prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client’s crime or fraud and requires
a lawyer to withdraw from any related representation when continued representation would
assist a client’s crime or fraud. Most states (37) permit, and four of them require, a lawyer
to disclose confidential information to prevent a client’s criminal fraud. Eighteen states
permit a lawyer to disclose confidential information to rectify or mitigate a past client fraud.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft
1983) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSBILITY
Canon 7-102(A) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1980) (requiring a lawyer to not conceal, counsel, assist,
or otherwise participate in a client’s illegal or fraudulent actions). See also Roger C.
Cramton et. al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley (Bos. U. Sch. of
L. Working Paper No. 04-20, 2010), http://www.bu.edu/law/workingpapersarchive/documents/koniak-et-al-sarbanes-oxley-04-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q22N-BYZG].
239. Failure to provide the report does not have a consequence on the status of the social
purpose corporation. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.150(4) (West 2016) (“The failure
to furnish to shareholders a social purpose report required by subsection (1) of this section
does not affect the validity of any corporate action.”).
240. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining that the reporting standards are
designed to make it easier “for a consumer to tell the difference between a ‘good company’
and just good marketing.”); see also Reiser, supra note 3, at 684 (summarizing that the
ultimate goal of social entrepreneurs who select a hybrid-entity form is brand recognition).
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company.241 “Many of the few [benefit] reports that are currently available
are self-promotional and do not provide much value to a reader looking for
a full, fair evaluation of the business.”242 Often the reports that have been
produced are not comprehensive and focus on reporting quantifiable
aspects of the mission impact and not the overall performance of the
company as stated in the Model or SPC statutes. If hybrid corporations
regularly produce annual benefit reports with little substance and marketing
puffery, it is unlikely that these benefit reports will contribute significantly
to the sector.243
Suggestions to improve the benefit reports have included providing
more quantifiable data points like the “percentage of revenue donated to
charities, hours per employee donated to charities, recycling per employee
(in pounds), and percentage of employees paid a living wage.”244 But these
reforms continue to focus on the benefit report as a marketing tool and do
not transform the established perception of this requirement. This narrow
conception of benefit reports has not been sufficiently interrogated in social
enterprise scholarship, and thus the sector has not embraced the generative
power of the benefit reporting requirement.
b. Founder perception of reporting as arduous and unnecessary
The perceived costs of producing and distributing benefit reports is
also a hurdle for social enterprise practitioners considering various forms of
business entities. If benefit reports do not create value for the social
enterprise, then hybrid corporations are likely “to use the weakest [and less
expensive] standard available [and] provide little to no useful information
to the market, and waste company resources in the process.”245 Of the
hybrid corporations in existence, empirical data suggests that the vast
majority of them “are not complying with the statutory benefit reporting
requirements,”246 perhaps the best indication of the relatively low priority
social enterprise practitioners have placed on these reports.247 Corporate
241. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 20.
242. Murray, supra note 24, at 360.
243. Id. at 361. “Reports alone provide little value if they fail to inform stakeholders or
support a dialogue that influences the decisions and behaviour of both the reporting
organization and its stakeholders.” SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES, GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE 9 (2002).
244. Id. at 360.
245. Id. at 361-62.
246. An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 42.
247. But see An Early Report on Benefit Reports supra note 152, at 43 (noting that the
lack a reporting might also be due to the lacking of familiarity with benefit reporting
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lawyers who understand the advantages of corporate reporting need to
advise social enterprises at the entity formation stage about how the regular
reports can engender good corporate governance. Even if the founders
decide not to incorporate the company as a hybrid corporation, they need to
understand and be advised about including benefit reporting into the fabric
of their social enterprise. Corporate lawyers have the expertise and the
opportunity, particularly at the entity formation stage, to explain to social
enterprise practitioners the potential long-term impact of including benefit
reporting as a self-regulatory governance tool.
III.

TOWARDS SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE

Federal regulations for enforcing and promoting good corporate
governance are not readily applicable to the social enterprise sector. Most
social enterprises are either small for-profits not subject to federal
regulation, or nonprofits with limited government oversight after entity
formation. Thus, it is not surprising that the social enterprise sector has not
advanced new corporate governance models that accommodate the needs
and complexity of the social enterprise ethos. A self-regulatory reporting
tool would not only strengthen an individual social enterprise’s governance
practices, but the dissemination of these benefit reports would help
establish governance norms tailored to the social enterprise sector. Benefit
reporting requirements provide a mechanism for social enterprises to reflect
on and revise their corporate governance, which should strengthen their
competitive advantage in the market place. An important role for corporate
lawyers is to advise social enterprises on the positive effects that benefit
reporting could have as a governance mechanism and to draft the reports
with the company. Because social enterprises can exist in a variety of legal
entities, there are a variety of corporate governance models that could be
developed. Legal counseling needs to explain why benefit reporting, as a
foundational aspect of any social enterprise regardless of the legal form,
promotes good governance and sustainability. Corporate lawyers should
refine their counsel on benefit reporting and social enterprise governance
accordingly.
A. Improving Social Enterprise Governance through Reporting
Social enterprises need practitioner-informed models of good
corporate governance that allow them to balance their social mission and
generally).
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commercial activities. As outlined above, when understood in the context
of new governance theory, benefit reporting practices can help social
enterprises develop and maintain good corporate governance. The benefit
reporting requirements in hybrid-corporation statutes offer a mechanism for
documenting, sharing, and refining social enterprise governance models,
which are necessary for the long-term success of these companies. Poor
corporate governance affects performance and sustainability. Good
governance
systems
engender
accountability,
communication,
commitment, and justice.248 Currently, the social enterprise sector does not
have external oversight or market focuses that adequately encourage the
development and refinement of best practices for social enterprise
governance.
Corporate lawyers can fill the gap between state facilitation of
transfirm norms and practitioner expertise to develop social enterprise
governance models. Corporate lawyers understand the traditional corporate
governance best practices and can play a vital role in implementing and
designing new governance models unique to the social enterprise sector.
Transactional lawyers have demonstrated that they “have the potential to
add value in no small part by translating their clients’ and the government’s
policy goals into the practical mechanisms of private ordering.”249
Corporate lawyers also are the conduits through which information within a
sector moves between firms to help share lessons learned through
experimentation. For corporate lawyers to be effective in helping social
enterprises develop innovative governance models, they should understand
the benefit reporting process as an opportunity to critically reflect on and
memorialize social enterprise governance practices. Corporate lawyers
would be instrumental in helping not only hybrid corporations understand
the value of benefit reports through a new governance theoretical lens, but
also in counseling all social enterprise entity forms on adopting benefit
reporting as a self-regulatory mechanism.
Hybrid corporations constitute only a portion of the social enterprise
sector. For benefit reporting to be transformative to the sector, all social
enterprises, regardless of entity form, should incorporate regular benefit
reporting as a fundamental component of the entity. If benefit reports are
encouraged and composed by corporate lawyers and informed by social
enterprise practitioners’ experiences, then benefit reports have the potential
to become an industry standard on which impact investors can rely for
248. See Litowitz, supra note 89, at 526 (“The profit motive has always favored secrecy,
but justice requires transparency.”).
249. Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-Private Transactions,
95 IOWA L. REV. 937, 943 (2009).
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helpful information about the potential success of the social enterprise.
This would further entrench the practice into the sector. Once entrenched,
benefit reporting will likely also be relied on by the sector and other
stakeholders for informing governance practices in new and emerging
social enterprises.
A large part of corporate governance is creating systems of
accountability so that directors can oversee managers, shareholders and
donors can oversee the board, and the government can oversee the
operations of the business. Reporting and disclosure requirements have
historically been the primary basis for regulators to create accountability
and ensure that corporate governance is maintained within the company.250
Regular reporting requirements provide a systemic way to measure and
monitor various levels of conduct and board oversight. The process of
preparing the report requires the company to review company decisions,
finances, and purpose. In this way, reporting promotes the development
and strengthening of communication channels across the company’s key
stakeholders, such as the board, managers, and owners or donors.
Companies can often identify and resolve issues without mandated
intervention from a regulating third-party if they take the self-reporting
process seriously. Self-regulation has often led “to greater levels of
collaboration among firms, stakeholders, and policy groups on matters
ranging from corporate best practices to market benchmarks and
performance standards.”251 The engagement with corporate lawyers,
consultants, and accountants to prepare the benefit reports would also
highlight issues for management and the board’s consideration. Reporting
also allows the company to regularly refine its messaging, evaluate its
progress, and adapt to changing environments. For these reasons, benefit
reporting can be an effective mechanism to ensure good social enterprise
governance.
Although empirical data establishes a relationship between the lack of
corporate governance and poor financial performance, good corporate
governance is not a panacea for business success.252 Nonetheless, it stands
250. Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
139, 139 (2004) (noting company reporting is “the chief method for cleansing fraud”).
251. Yockey, supra note 113, at 803.
252. Ben Emukufia Akpoyomare Oghojafor et al., Poor Corporate Governance and Its
Consequences on the Nigerian Banking Sector, 5 SERB. J. MGMT. 243, 247 (2010).
Generally, the link between good corporate governance and economic returns is thinly
supported by empirical evidence. See e.g., Duc Hong Vo & Tri Minh Nguyen, The Impact
of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance: Empirical Study in Vietnam, INT’L, J.
ECON. & FIN., June 2014, at 1 (examining empirical research on relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance in Vietnam); Tek Lama, Empirical Evidence on
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to reason that the process of reflection through regular disclosures, with
appropriate company action based on the information discovered through
the reporting process, facilitates the long-term sustainability of the
company.253 This is particularly important in the social enterprise sector
where sustained social change is the touchstone for a successful company,
rather than maximizing corporate profits. Professors DiMaggio and Powell
suggest that institutional pressures will lead organizations to model
themselves upon established firms to garner legitimacy, a process they refer
to as isomorphism.254 While formal pressures may originate from the
government, the legal environment or important stakeholders (e.g., funders
or partners), normative pressures, they argue, will lead organizations to
adopting structures and practices based on norms and values promoted by
successful institutional actors.255 As the social enterprises that regularly
engage in benefit reporting establish themselves as market leaders, other
social enterprises in the sector are likely to adopt the practice of reporting
and documenting governance models to advance their social mission and
help ensure a sustainable business.
1. Criticisms of Mandatory Reporting Less Applicable to Benefit
Reports
While annual reporting is a standard practice for public companies,
regulatory reporting has not achieved the full impact of its potential to
improve corporate governance.256 There are limitations on what regular
the Link Between Compliance with Governance of Best Practice and Firms’ Operating
Results, 6 AUSTL. ACCT. BUS. & FIN. J., no. 5, 2012, at 63 (examining 60 sample firms to
establish the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance). But
see MARK HIRSCHEY ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 85 (1st ed.
2009) (“Despite repeated attempts by academics to show an irrefutable link between
[corporate governance and shareholder returns], the results are largely inconclusive. Some
empirical studies find important linkages between corporate governance and financial
performance measures. Yet, other research . . . reports mixed and often weak results.”).
253. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An
Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357,
380-87 (2003) (discussing how most directors unconsciously make self-interested decisions,
tend to be over-confident, and operate on cognitive dissonance).
254. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147,
151 (1983) (identifying that “when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates
symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations” that they
perceive to be more legitimate and successful).
255. Id.
256. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679 (2011) (“Mandated disclosure is not doomed to fail, but it rarely
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reporting can be expected to achieve. The following sections outline two
of the major criticisms of mandatory, regulatory reporting requirements.
This Article argues, however, that much of this criticism is less applicable
to a voluntary benefit reporting process for social enterprises.
a. Information overload not applicable to most social
enterprises
One criticism is that companies simply focus on fulfilling the duty of
disclosing rather than reporting information of any real substance. In other
words, although public companies may disclose the required information,
too much is produced to be adequately scrutinized or questioned. As others
have explained, “[t]he explicit disclosure requirements of the federal
securities laws are detailed and extensive, and the task public companies
face in complying with the explicit disclosure requirements is daunting.”257
Moreover, large companies with substantial amounts of information have
the ability to bury potentially questionable facts or accounting practices in
intentionally large disclosures that no stakeholders have the time or energy
to careful sift through.258 The quantity and “complexity of many
[mandatory] disclosures, the innumeracy and illiteracy of many readers,
and the burden of accumulating amounts of disclosure . . . [all] limit the
effectiveness of [regulatory reporting requirements].”259 The ability for a
succeeds . . . . Rarely can each actor accomplish all that is needed, and therefore mandated
disclosures rarely work as planned.”).
257. Porter, supra note 67, at 2255.
258. See Celia R. Taylor, Drowning in Disclosure: The Overburdening of Securities &
Exchange Commission, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 85, 87 (2014) (referring to the SEC as “a
disclosure dumping ground”); see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 433
(2003) (discussing how disclosures will not protect investors or result in better decisions if
investors cannot process all of the information, which can be too long, complex or buried
within large disclosures).
259. An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 152, at 37; see also Lin, supra note
44, at 367-68 (adding that “the economic incentives do not properly encourage most
individual investors to educate themselves by reading securities disclosures . . . . Many
institutional investors, for instance, are transient investors focused on quarterly or annual
returns for their portfolio of numerous investments. Therefore it makes little sense for them
to engage in prolonged shareholder activism and monitoring, where they bear much of the
costs of the fight, and their competitors can free-ride the benefits of their efforts.”); ARTHUR
LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: HOW TO FIGHT FOR YOUR FINANCIAL FUTURE 44 (2003)
(explaining his frustration reading mutual fund prospectuses and coming to the conclusion
they were “written in impenetrable legalese, by and for securities lawyers”); Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Corporate Governance Issues Grow More Complex, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 21, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/corporate-governance-
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board, and to a greater extent the federal government, to substantively
monitor risks and provide oversight through a reporting process necessarily
diminishes when applied to multinational institutions.260 However, there
are few social enterprises currently in existence that compare in size or
magnitude to the multinational institutions that have failed despite being
subject to extensive reporting requirements.261 While there are significant
social enterprises such as The Honest Company, Inc. or Revolutionary
Foods,262 the vast majority of social enterprises tend to be smaller
companies that, even with growth potential, are likely to remain privatelyheld companies. Thus, the quantity and complexity of information to be
disclosed and reported would often be more manageable for social
enterprises.
b. Increased access to justice minimizes the finanical costs
Another major criticism of reporting requirements is that the expense
of regulatory reporting outweighs the objectives of mandated disclosures.
There is no doubt that the cost of regulatory reporting is significant for
public companies. Many of these costs are spent on corporate lawyers and
accountants who are required to have specialized expertise on regulatory
compliance across several evolving areas of law. Maintaining systems of
monitoring public companies is also time consuming and expensive for the
federal government given that “[p]ublic corporations are extraordinarily
intricate institutions that pursue complex, large-scale projects.”263 Public
companies can “resemble political nation-states with multiple
constituencies.”264 For this reason, it can take years before federal agencies
detect and correct problems of poor corporate governance or other
issues-grow-more-complex/ [https://perma.cc/A4GZ-2B29] (highlighting that even with
robust reporting requirements there are still “boards like the one at Enron, which was highly
rated for corporate governance but made foolish — and ultimately disastrous — decisions”).
260. Aronson, supra note 58, at 131 (discussing the SEC’s systemic failure to regulate
Enron as evidence by its lack of review of financial statements from 1997 to 2002, when the
company collapsed).
261. An example of a multinational social enterprise is Mondragon Corporation, Spain’s
tenth largest business group with approximately 74,000 employees and cooperative owners.
For more information see Mondragon Corporation, MONDRAGON, http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/ [https://perma.cc/DE27-GY7N] (last visited May 19, 2016).
262. The Honest Company may be the first California social enterprise to have an initial
public offering. Douglas MacMillan & Rolfe Winkler, Jessica Alba’s Startup, Honest,
Valued at $1.7 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/jessicaalbas-startup-honest-valued-at-1-7-billion-1439477917 [https://perma.cc/S7EE-WMAX].
263. Stop Teaching Dodge, supra note 18, at 175.
264. Id.
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misdeeds.
Issues of extensive cost, however, are less applicable to benefit
reporting because there are few requirements that control benefit reports of
hybrid corporations, and benefit reporting by other entity forms would be
self-regulated by the individual companies. Moreover, pro bono corporate
representation is an underutilized resource that social enterprises could use
to offset the financial burdens of benefit reporting. Many law firms
provide pro bono representation to nonprofit entities.265 Nonprofit social
enterprises within the applicable pro bono client guidelines should access
pro bono corporate counsel to help draft the benefit reports. Law firms
should also be encouraged to provide access to pro bono services or
deferred payment fee structures to for-profit social enterprises. Although
operating through a for-profit model, for-profit social enterprises often
have limited financial bandwidth as profits are often reinvested back into
advancing the social mission. Their limited financial resources and focus
on social mission make them analogous to nonprofit organizations and,
thus, law firms should recognize them as eligible pro bono clients. Pro
bono options for corporate lawyers should be expanded to include forprofit social enterprise in part because “business law pro bono still remains
more of a potential than a realization.”266 However, even if a law firm does
not include for-profit social enterprises in their pro bono policy, law firms
could increase social enterprise access to corporate lawyers by
implementing a per se deferred payment policy for for-profit social
enterprises. Under this fee structure, for example, payments could be
deferred until the social enterprise closes a significant funding round or a
liquidating transaction. This is a common fee structure for start-up
technology companies because law firms recognize that emerging
companies need access to corporate lawyers and that investing preventative
legal resources in early-stage companies can have significant financial
returns. Drafting MD&A sections and conducting diligence for benefit
reports would be excellent training and exposure for junior associates who
need to learn how to compose disclosure materials for their public company
and private-equity clients. Thus, providing pro bono or deferred payment
representation to social enterprises would be advantageous for law firms as
well as social enterprises.
265. Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 44 (2004)
(“Referral organizations focused on linking transactional business lawyers with nonprofit
and small for-profit organizational clients have gained increased attention within the pro
bono system.”).
266. James L. Baillie, Fulfilling the Promise of Business Law Pro Bono, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1543, 1563 (2002).
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In addition to expanded pro bono and deferred payment policies at law
firms, business law clinics should also include advising clients as they
prepare benefit reports in their list of client services. With the drastic
increase in business law clinics over the last decade,267 many law schools
across the country now have the capacity to assist social enterprises
compose regular benefit reports and assess their corporate governance
practices in the process.268 A goal of many business law clinics is to not
only prepare law students for the impending rigors of corporate practice,
but also to close the access to justice gap for marginalized constituencies.
Similar to junior associates at law firms working pro bono, law students in
business law clinics would benefit from the experience of conducting
diligence, composing benefit reports, and advising their social enterprise
clients as they think critically about their current governance practices.
Moreover, recognizing the impact that business law clinics could have in
helping social enterprises develop governance models that address the
complexities of their businesses, benefit reporting representation would be
an appropriate client matter for these clinical programs to take on. As a
result of increased access to law firms and business law clinics, the relative
financial burden of benefit reporting to social enterprises would be
significantly less than the cost of compliance for public companies with
intricate reporting requirements under SOX, Dodd-Frank, or other
reporting required by the SEC.
B. Impacts of Reporting on Social Enterprise Governance
Promoting good social enterprise governance does not require
expansion of federal or state oversight to small social enterprises, which
could impede growth in the sector with the increased cost of government
regulation.269 The innovation of benefit reports in hybrid-corporation
267. See Jennifer Fan, Institutionalizing the USPTO Law School Clinic Certification
Program for Transactional Law Clinics, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 327, 332 n. 14 (2015)
(identifying 188 transactional law clinics as of August 1, 2014). See also Jones and Lainez,
supra note 16, at 93 (noting that in 2013 there were more than 140 transactional clinics at
just over 200 American Bar Association approved law schools, which is a 2700% increase
over the 5 transactional clinics reported in 1992).
268. See Alina S. Ball, Disruptive Pedagogy: Incorporating Critical Theory in Business
Law Clinics, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 701 (2015); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social
Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215 (2013); Patience Crowder, Transactional Community
Lawyering: Introducing Denver Law’s New Community Economic Development Clinic,
DEN. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlronlinearticle/2011/4/22/transactional-community-lawyering-introducing-denver-lawsne.html [https://perma.cc/M3CR-UQRB].
269. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
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legislation has given the social enterprise sector a method for incorporating
regular reporting into the fabric of the entity form to improve and track
good governance practices. The sector should broadly embrace the practice
of regular reporting and support the development of good corporate
governance that would flow from its implementation. Even if benefit
reporting is not adopted universally across all social enterprises, the
reporting process would yield a positive impact to participating social
enterprises and a net positive for the sector.
The marketplace can be an effective compliance officer.270 The
positive response from impact investors and donors, and the sustainability
of the participating social enterprises, will determine whether benefit
reporting takes hold as a transfirm norm within the social enterprise sector.
Corporate lawyers are often characterized as gatekeepers, but they are also
norm facilitators.271 Thus, the intimate involvement of corporate lawyers in
the benefit reporting process is necessary to facilitate the positive
outcomes, as outlined below, in the social enterprise sector.272

Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 59 (1992) (“The problem is not the system of laws,
regulations, and judicial decisions which are the framework of corporate governance.”).
270
See Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance:
Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 229, 236 (2006) (arguing that companies “may have
specific incentives to disclose their governance practices” to prevent “devaluation of the
firm by the market” and the “network externalities that could occur if they do not adopt
governance practice.”).
271. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Guardians Adrift: The Social Anthropology of the
Corporate Gatekeeper Professions, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 225, 262-63 (2007)
(explaining that the law provides insight into a culture’s perceptions and norms); see also
Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 333 (2006) (describing “lawyers working within
organizations to use a capacity-building orientation simultaneously to advance core
institutional values and to achieve compliance with the law.”); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. &
Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 68 (2003) (characterizing the Model Code of Professional Conduct
as a “pronouncement of societal norms”); John Gerard Ruggie, Global Governance and
“New Governance Theory”: Lessons from Business and Human Rights, 20 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 5, 14
(Jan.-Mar. 2014) (explaining how the involvement of corporate lawyers in the development
of the UN Human Right Council Guiding Principles had the cascading effect of “raising its
visibility within companies to general counsel and even chief executive officer levels, rather
than being confined to corporate social responsibility departments.”).
272. See Lisa T. Alexander, supra note 235, at 741–42 (noting that while the role of
lawyer remains underdeveloped in new governance scholarship, there is an emphasis on the
need for collaborative lawyering).
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1. Flexibility Engenders Organizational Buy-in
One of the criticisms of externally imposed reporting requirements is
the difficulty of assessing whether the company is simply fulfilling an
imposed requirement or if there is a genuine culture of corporate
governance that permeates the company.273 While institutional investors
generally express support for corporate governance reforms, empirical
evidence has shown that investors believe that “the most important point to
emphasize is the maintenance of self-regulation.”274 A voluntary benefit
reporting system as suggested in this Article allows for social enterprise
directors and executives to make determinations about the reporting
process and define the contours of the report so that the product and
process are helpful for the company. Executive and board participation in
the design of the benefit reporting process could therefore engender the
long-term engagement that is necessary to shift the culture towards
prioritizing good corporate governance.
2. Stakeholder Governance and Participatory Democracy
As mentioned above, stakeholder engagement is what contributes to
the foundationally distinct nature of social enterprise governance.
Stakeholders are “[a]ny identifiable group or individual who can affect the
achievement of an organization’s objectives, or who is affected by the
achievement of an organization’s objective.”275 The participation of
stakeholders in social enterprise governance is significant to the sector’s
success because “stakeholders who feel included in the corporate decisionmaking process demonstrate a higher level of emotional investment and
commitment to the firm’s mission.”276 Participatory governance, which
meaningfully engages stakeholders in resolving problems affecting them,277
is another component of social enterprise governance that makes it distinct
273. See Ruth V. Aguilera, Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: An
Institutional Comparative Perspective, 16 BRIT. J. MGMT. S39, S43 (2005) (“One of the
problems with codes of good governance is that it is hard to assess whether or not codes are
simply a box-ticking corporate governance tool decoupled from a transformation in the
firm’s corporate governance culture.”).
274. JILL SOLOMON & ARIS SOLOMON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
137 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2004).
275. R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New
Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 91 (1983).
276. Yockey, supra note 113, at 804.
277. Lee, supra note 192, at 405 (“In recent decades, courts, legislatures, administrative
agencies, and other institutions all have used participatory-governance approaches to tackle
complex problems of law and public policy.”).
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from traditional models of corporate governance. Part of what makes
stakeholder governance particularly difficult for social enterprises is that
their key stakeholders are often members of marginalized populations.
Recall the social enterprise case studies in Part I where stakeholders in
social enterprise Number One included employees who were formerly
incarcerated,278 and the stakeholders in social enterprise Number Two
included individuals suffering from food insecurity.279 What makes social
enterprises potentially revolutionary is the possibility that “marginalized
stakeholders—those who traditionally have had little influence on matters
of governance and who are subject to subordination under the systems
under reform—can meaningfully participate in the process.”280 Often in
practice, however, “marginalized stakeholders do not actually influence the
outcome, the participatory process becomes merely ‘cosmetic’ and
affirmatively subverts the good-governance aims that it is meant to
achieve.”281 This is problematic because “[m]arginalized stakeholders are
uniquely positioned to offer [social enterprises] information, perspectives,
and ideas, as well as to serve as a check on more established actors who
might otherwise use New Governance processes to further regulatory
capture.”282
For these reasons, social enterprises need guidance and support to
intentionally create governance models that can prioritize and manage
relations with stakeholders, particularly the marginalized stakeholders they
serve and seek to empower.283 “The normative foundation of the
stakeholder-focused organization provides legitimacy for [the] existence”
of social enterprises, as social enterprises are often “created by people who
are closely linked with the community they intend to serve.”284 If social
enterprises do not develop meaningful ways to engage marginalized
stakeholders into their governance, it would not only undermine the
legitimacy of individual businesses but also threaten the growth of the
sector.285 The benefit reporting process can provide a contemplative
278. See supra Part I.A.i.
279. See supra Part I.A.ii.
280. Lee, supra note 192, at 406.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 409–10.
283. See Mason et. al., supra note 155, at 288 (“[G]overnance structures should
facilitate managing the claims of the stakeholders they serve.”).
284. Id. at 284.
285. See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons
from Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
117, 174–76 (2009) (identifying how limited stakeholder participation contributed to the
failures of HOPE VI in Chicago case studies).
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opportunity for the social enterprise to evaluate whether its current
governance structure is accomplishing the goals of stakeholder governance.
Once weaknesses in the governance structure are acknowledged, the social
enterprise can work with its corporate lawyer to refine and revise its
governance structure to address those weaknesses and improve the
deliberative process when making decisions that invoke competing
interests amongst stakeholders.
3. Information Production
Directors often lack sufficient information to make informed decisions
and provide effective executive oversight. Similarly, executives and
managers benefit from having better access to information on the
performance of the company. Many of the widely accepted measures for
improving corporate governance in small companies, such as clearly
defined division of authority, organizational goals, and standards for review
of executive performance,286 require the company to have access to
information on its performance and documentation of lessons learned
through its operation.
Thus, the type and quality of information that social enterprises
include in their benefit report can have a significant influence on improving
the governance of the company. To date, benefit reports have often
focused on documenting quantifiable data without including a more
comprehensive analysis of the company’s performance. Moving forward,
corporate lawyers should advise their social enterprise clients on the value
of preparing benefit reports that also capture qualitative information on
how the company is incorporating those lessons learned on corporate
governance into the structure of the business. This information would
become more valuable as it builds on lessons learned in the previous years.
The benefit reports could, for example, highlight changes from the previous
year’s benefit report whenever possible to save the company time in
preparing the report and save the investors’ and stakeholders’ time in
reviewing the report. This approach would not only give the reader a
chance to compare different organizations in the field but also better
evaluate the progress of the social enterprise over time.
4. Refine Board Composition
One of the attributes of regular reporting on corporate governance is
286. See supra Part I.B.ii.
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that the process of gathering information and reviewing it with the board
provides the directors an opportunity to self-reflect and to determine
whether the board’s current composition is appropriate for the needs of the
company. Social enterprises that develop models for incorporating
stakeholder participation become better at collecting information on the
company, which will likely influence how directors make decisions about
who serves on the board. The process of reporting can also encourage
boards to address whether additional expertise is needed in the boardroom
to provide the company with better oversight. The board of any social
enterprise should have a mixture of functional skills and access to
information on how to assess the company’s social impact as well as
evaluate the market-based strategies. Successful boards will want to
foresee where the company is headed in the future and have individuals
with the appropriate expertise on the board to help the company move
forward in strategic directions. There is a relationship between board
composition and firm performance.287 Social enterprise boards must
therefore engage in strategic planning about their composition. In addition
to reviewing the characteristics and contributions of individual directors,
the benefit report would provide social enterprise boards an opportunity to
evaluate its effectiveness in providing the executives and managers with
sufficient oversight and guidance.288 This reflection and evaluation is not
likely to occur in the social enterprise sector without the information
produced and reviewed during a regular reporting process.
C. Implementing Benefit Reporting Across Entity Form
A social enterprise can elect when to engage in a reporting process;
but if it is not a fundamental aspect of the company identity, other activities
will likely arise that are more urgent, but not more important, than regular
reporting. Thus, corporate lawyers advising and counseling social
enterprise clients on how to bake benefit reporting and accountability into
the fabric of the entity form is a necessary component of advancing social
enterprise governance.
287. See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards:
How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 395 (2014) (noting
that female directors and directors of color have different life experiences that allows for
them to bring “a wider range of options and solutions to corporate issues”) (quoting Lisa M.
Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued
Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 590 (2006)).
288. See JOHN L. WARD, CREATING EFFECTIVE BOARDS FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 3-4
(1991) (explaining that the board serves as a sparring partner for the company executives to
test their strengths and weaknesses before products and ideas reach the marketplace).
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1. Organizational Documents
In drafting organizational documents for a social enterprise, corporate
lawyers should advise their clients to consider integrating regular reporting
that is analogous to the benefit reporting requirements for hybrid
corporations. Reporting requirements can be included in the bylaws of a
corporation or the operating agreement of a LLC, or a company policy.
Corporate lawyers should also advise their social enterprise clients on the
value of establishing a benefit officer289 position as an effective way of
maintaining this self-regulatory process. Some audit committees, for
example, have strengthened the evaluation and replacement of a
corporation’s independent auditor. In similar fashion, a benefit officer
position designates an individual to ensure that the social enterprise
engages in the reporting process in a thoughtful and consistent manner.
CONCLUSION
The social enterprise movement is still in its infancy and has yet to
develop governance practices and models that account for the complexity
of this sector. This dearth of social enterprise governance models is
problematic given the complications of the competing interests within each
social enterprise. The hybrid-corporation statutes address this current
vacuum in social enterprise governance by providing benefit reporting as a
mechanism to document, disseminate, and refine good governance
practices. These new corporate law statutes should be viewed as norm
creating vehicles; as benefit reporting can play an important role as a
governance mechanism within the social enterprise sector. Benefit
reporting cannot be transformative if only marginally adopted by the
limited number of hybrid corporations currently in existence. Thus, all
social enterprises, regardless of entity form, should take advantage of
regular benefit reporting to hone their corporate narrative and develop
appropriate stakeholder governance models. Corporate lawyers can serve
an important function in advancing social enterprise governance by
advising their clients how to integrate into the foundation of the company a
benefit reporting system and participating in the report drafting process.
The process of regular benefit reporting would facilitate the
establishment of governance models unique to the social enterprise sector.
The knowledge and participation of social enterprise practitioners is critical
289. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 304 (B LAB Jan. 13, 2016) (defining functions
of a benefit officer).
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to the success of this new governance experiment to promote social
enterprise governance. Thus, corporate lawyers will need to work
collaboratively with social enterprise executives to design and implement
benefit reporting processes. The contributions and expertise of corporate
lawyers in developing good social enterprise governance can lead to more
sustainable social enterprises, which would ultimately foster a more
equitable and inclusive economy.

